Infantry

May-June 2008

Cultural Competence

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FRONT COVER:
A Soldier with the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division talks with an Iraqi man during a cordon and search mission in Baghdad September 25, 2007. (Photo by TSGT Andrew M. Rodier, USAF)

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Cultural Competence
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
BACK COVER:
A Soldier with the 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division, scales the rooftop of a home during a mission in Iraq April 3. (Photo by SSG Samuel Bendet, USAF)

Commandant's Note

CULTURAL AWARENESS —
USEFUL TODAY, VITAL TOMORROW

An understanding of foreign cultures and languages has long been part of the American Soldier's heritage. During both World Wars and even today, many members of our uniformed services were the sons and daughters of immigrants, and hence were imbued with the languages, customs, and cultures of their parents' countries of origin. German, French, Japanese, Polish, Russian, Italian, and other languages were familiar to them, and these language skills proved invaluable when their units found themselves fighting on foreign soil or confronted with refugees and populations uprooted by military operations.

The Army has made use of its own unique cultural heritage; Native American code talkers took advantage of the enemy's ignorance of the Cherokee, Choctaw, Navaho, and Comanche languages and confounded enemy radio intercept efforts by transmitting messages in their own dialects during both World Wars and the Korean War. For other Soldiers, however, cross-cultural awareness does not come easily and has had to be taught, both in those earlier conflicts and today in the global war on terrorism (GWOT). In this month's Commandant's Note I want to highlight the benefits of timely, informed cross-cultural interaction in today's irregular warfare and its potential for future applications.

Following the terrorists' attacks on September 11, 2001, we deployed forces into regions with languages and cultural traditions far different from our own. Special Operations forces sent to work among the Afghan tribes relied upon their own knowledge of Pashtu and Persian dialects and the services of translators to gain credibility and elicit the support of warlords opposed to the Taliban regime. Their experience clearly showed that the motivations and allegiances of combatants hung more on local and regional issues than on international ones. As the GWOT has unfolded, some U.S. Soldiers of Middle Eastern ancestry have shared their varying levels of cultural and linguistic knowledge as we brought the war first to the Taliban and then to Saddam Hussein.

We learned early on that cultural awareness would play a key role toward securing an ultimate, lasting peace. Recognizing the importance of training our Soldiers in this vital dimension of readiness, we have made every effort to imbed cultural awareness training into both individual and collective training. Fort Benning continues to lead the Army in educating Soldiers, from privates in Initial Entry Training through senior officers who attend the Infantry Pre-Command Course, about cultural awareness. The focus of this training is on the doctrinal aspects of cultural awareness: the eight variables of the contemporary operational environment, consideration of noncombatants as part of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and the Every Soldier is a Sensor initiative.

Any effort to develop cultural awareness must address regional history, religious and political factions, geography, infrastructure, customs, and the local economy, but it also has to go well beyond those to include somewhat more esoteric realities such as the hierarchy of loyalties to family, clan, and tribe. These loyalties are not laws unto themselves, however, and are subject to other variables such as family honor and situational religious considerations, and it is important that we understand these and how they affect our counterparts. Body language is another subtle yet essential element of understanding the culture, and we know it is possible to give unintended offense which can undermine weeks or months spent in building rapport. T.E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* illustrates the subtleties of his dealings with — and his acceptance by — the Arabs, and offers lessons we would do well to heed.

The pre-deployment lessons of cultural awareness are valuable, but they are only the introduction to the real learning that will take place in theater, where Soldiers and their leaders will better appreciate the nuances of the culture and the allies with whom they serve. As we learn more about our allies and our enemies, we form a better picture of their motives, their value systems, and their likely responses to a given situation. This will enable us to better gather and interpret the human intelligence that is the lifeblood of counterinsurgency.

As the global war on terrorism has evolved, so too has our Army, both in terms of the lessons we have learned and in the ways we deny the enemy access to our tactics, techniques, and procedures. The lessons we have learned in the derivation and dissemination of cultural awareness knowledge is not limited to the GWOT, and will find applicability and further refinements as we train to interact in new environments, with new allies, and against different enemies.

Follow me!

Command Sergeant Major's Corner

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR WILLIAM J. ULIBARRI

CULTURAL AWARENESS —
WINNING AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL

At the tactical level, our NCO leaders must understand and emphasize the importance of cultural awareness and its potential impact on operations. Squad leaders and platoon sergeants routinely interact face-to-face with Iraqi and Afghani citizens, sometimes on a daily basis, and more importantly they lead and influence our Soldiers who do the same. This is why it is imperative they are sensitive to the potential impact of their actions as well as those of the Soldiers they train and lead.

It is now commonplace for many, if not most, platoon and company level operations to include Iraqi police or army personnel, and these operations demand that Soldiers be sensitive to the implications of their interaction with local forces. We send a strong signal to insurgents when it is obvious that American and Iraqi or Afghani Soldiers work well together. When American Soldiers demonstrate basic professional respect and courtesy towards each other and our counterparts alike, it sends a strong message. It tells the insurgents that now they have to fight a unified, allied component in the new Iraq or Afghanistan. Additionally, our Iraqi and Afghani NCO counterparts watch the way we treat our own subordinates, and our interaction with our subordinates communicates our values and attitudes towards them, both positive and negative. Whether we like it or not, we are sending that message, and we need to make sure it is a positive, consistent one. This is extremely important, and will become even more so as those countries look to our Army as the standard as they go about developing their own NCO corps.

In addition to the ever-increasing proportion of combined operations, brigade combat teams are also increasing their role in training our allies. We are training Iraqi Army and Afghan National Army forces as well as police forces in cities and on the border. U.S. units determine what training is necessary and augment transition team training to develop local forces in their area of operation; however, regardless of the type of training, one common aspect is that American NCOs are likely to be heavily involved as primary trainers or in coaching roles. Our NCOs can have a huge positive impact on local forces if they are not only culturally aware, but also culturally proficient. I submit that NCOs are already developing and employing this higher level of awareness as they interact with local forces, both in a training role and during combined patrols. Another way our Soldiers, NCOs, and officers are developing and demonstrating higher levels of cultural awareness is by enrolling in language training. Soldiers' foreign language skills may be rudimentary at first, but they will steadily improve and their efforts will not go unnoticed.

When we attempt to communicate with our counterparts in their native tongue, we demonstrate respect toward their culture, and Soldiers are leveraging Army e-Learning to enhance their ability to communicate in the local languages. For example, language instruction "has been available on Army e-Learning since November 2005, and over 115,000 Soldiers have spent 600,000 hours studying Rosetta Stone's 30 languages. In just three OIF and OEF related languages (Arabic, Farsi, and Pashto), Soldiers have completed 90,000 hours of language training," according to the December 4, 2007, issue of *STAND-TO.* I encourage squad leaders and platoon sergeants to explore this opportunity for their Soldiers' development; it is an opportunity that will both enhance the Soldiers' professional development and increase the lethality of our formations.

In the early days of OIF and OEF, cultural awareness training was rudimentary, focusing on bare fundamentals and consisting of little more than what gestures to avoid and a few key phrases. Today our infantrymen are learning languages online and applying their skills while working side-by-side with Iraqi and Afghan soldiers in training and in combat. While nobody is forcing them to develop language skills, they are using their own initiative because they understand that their newfound language skills and cultural awareness will enable them to do their jobs more effectively. As we develop our Soldiers and subordinate leaders, we should recognize cultural awareness training as a means toward developing cultural adaptability, which is one of the eight dimensions of adaptive performance, as outlined by Elaine D. Pulakos, David W. Dorsey, and Rose A. Mueller-Hanson in a Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology presentation in April 2005. The other seven dimensions are: handling emergencies or crisis situations; learning work tasks, technologies, and procedures; handling work stress; demonstrating interpersonal adaptability; solving problems creatively, dealing effectively with unpredictable or changing work situations; and demonstrating physically oriented adaptability.

The Infantry School trains flexible, adaptive leaders, and nowhere are these traits more important than in developing and sustaining cultural awareness. Infantrymen have proven themselves to be highly adaptive throughout the global war on terrorism, and the cultural awareness we are developing today will pay great dividends as we and our allies bring this war to a successful conclusion.

Follow me!

Intelligence Center Offers MTTs on Cultural Awareness, Intel Topics

The United States Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) in conjunction with U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Forces Command (FORSCOM) and Department of the Army G2 executes Warfighter Function (WFF)-related mobile training for units preparing for future deployments in support of the global war on terrorism (Operation Iraqi Freedom [OIF], Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF], Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa [HOA], Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay [GTMO]) and transformation.

This effort began in July 2004, and since that time more than 60,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines have been trained.

Cultural Awareness Mobile Training Team (MTT)

This training provides a specific overview in Middle Eastern, Central Asian and African cultures, religion, geography and history in the form of train-the-trainer (TTT) and traditional training to warfighters. Intent is to provide the most up-to-date information available that is tailored to the level or intensity desired focusing on OIF/OEF/HOA/GTMO operations.

The Cultural Awareness (CA) MTTs:

Ø Conduct TTT to TRADOC schools in order for the schools to incorporate CA into their institutional training;

Ø Conduct TTT to FORSCOM units in order for the Soldiers to train their own units prior to deployment; and

Ø Conduct cultural awareness training for warfighters. Warfighter training is typically conducted in 16 to 8 hour training rotations.

The curriculum ranges from four to 40 hours and includes overviews on the country and culture as well as tactical application of cultural knowledge (TACK) exercises.

The following country studies are available by special request: Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Kuwait, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Philippines.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection Team MTT

The HUMINT Collection Team (HCT) training program objective is to prepare the deploying HCTs for operations in the area where they are getting ready to deploy (either Iraq or Afghanistan).

The HCT training program primary audience is HUMINT Collectors (97E) and Counterintelligence Special Agents (97B) of all ranks who are task organized into HCTs.

The HCT training program uses the lecture and conference methods of training to cover topics including legal parameters, applied culture, basic questioning, deception detection, Debriefing, and reporting.

During the last three days of the training, a culmination practical exercise based on a realistic scenario provides the Soldiers with situations they may encounter while conducting HUMINT operations in a deployed environment. During the culmination training exercise, the Soldiers apply everything they learned during the first six days of the training to real-life situations.

Tactical Questioning MTT

The tactical questioning (TQ) training program's objective is to prepare deploying Soldiers to be passive information collectors consistent with the Every Soldier a Sensor concept. The TQ training program's primary audience is Soldiers of all ranks and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).

The TQ training program uses the lecture method of training to cover topics including cultural awareness, questioning techniques and SALUTE report, rapport building, nonverbal communication and detainee handling.

To Set Up an MTT

Units interested in setting up an MTT on any of the topics should contact Art Vigil at (520) 538-4338 or DSN 879-4338 or e-mail arthur.vigil@us.army.mil

2008 Infantry Warfighting Conference Set

Fort Benning will host the 2008 Infantry Warfighting Conference September 15-17.
The conference will be held at Fort Benning and the Iron Works Convention Center in Columbus, Georgia. The conference is open to all Infantry and Army leaders.
Register at www.benning.army.mil/infantry or www.fbcinc.com/infantry.
For more information contact CPT Nicholas Turner or Cliff Davis at
DSN 835-0927/9734/8528 or commercial (706) 545-0927/9734/8528

NEWS BRIEFS

Center for Military History Collecting Historical Documents

The U.S. Army Center for Military History is collecting operational records relating to Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. While a tremendous number of records have been collected by deployed U.S. Army Military History Detachments and other military historians, significant gaps still exist. Efforts by historians to chronicle the Total Army's contributions to the global war on terrorism have also been constrained by gaps in available records. This is especially true with regard to the combat experiences of individual Soldiers.

Documents of historical significance required for a narrative account of major events include but are not limited to:
* Command & control (C2)
* Operations plans
* Maps/charts/drawings
* After action reports
* Operations summaries
* Correspondence (e-mails/letters/notes/meeting minutes/messages)
* Senior leader guidance
* Journals
* Intelligence summaries
* Special studies/briefings

For more information or to submit a document, contact LTC Robert Smith at robert.smith38@us.army.mil.

New Developmental Counseling Course Available Online

The Combined Arms Center - Center for Army Leadership (CAL) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has recently released a new online course for all Army leaders on developmental counseling. This course consists of three modules, totaling approximately 11 hours of instruction. The modules cover types of counseling, leaders as counselors, and the counseling process.

FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*, the Army's newest leadership doctrine, states that "counseling is one of the most important leadership development responsibilities for Army leaders." This counseling course is one way for leaders to hone their counseling skills and to help prepare for greater responsibility. Since the course is online and accessible through the Internet, Army leaders can work on the course at a time and place that is convenient to them.

"There are two important reasons to improve counseling skills," says SGM Joel Jacobs, Center for Army Leadership.

"Counseling is one of the most important ways to develop subordinates. The second reason is that counseling helps the leader and Soldier to come to a common understanding about the mission and how it needs to be accomplished."

The Developmental Counseling Course and FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*, are both available on the Combined Arms Center Web site at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/digitalpublications.asp.

Media interested in learning more about the Developmental Counseling Course should contact Dr. Jon Fallesen at the Center for Army Leadership, (913) 758-3160.

17th Infantry Regiment Association Reunion Set

The 2008 17th Infantry Regiment Association Reunion is set for August 27-30 in Tacoma, Washington. It will be held at the La Quinta Inn & Suites — (253) 383-0146. This reunion is open to any veteran of the 17th Infantry Regiment — peace time or war — any family member of 17th Infantry Soldiers, or any personnel who were attached to the 17th Regiment at any time.

For more information, contact Don Shook at (724) 367-1096 or visit www.17thinfantry.com.

ARMY OFFERS RENEWED INCENTIVES FOR CAPTAINS TO STAY

In an effort to encourage more mid-grade officers to remain in service, the Army is again offering a "menu of incentives" for active-component captains that includes options for a cash bonus and attendance at graduate school or the Defense Language Institute.

The incentives are available to eligible captains through November 30.

The program is essentially the same as last year, HRC officials said, with minor changes: First, active-component category officers and select Medical Service Corps and Army Nurse Corps officers in basic year group 2005 will now be eligible to participate. Qualifying officers in year groups 1999 through 2004 who did not participate in the first program will still remain eligible. Second, the branch of choice, post of choice and Ranger School options will not be offered.

The menu of options available this year are:

1) The cash option, payable in the same $25,000, $30,000, or $35,000 tiers based on the officer's accessed branch;

2) The Expanded Graduate School Program option, which is fully funded graduate school; or

3) The Defense Language School option, based upon a pre-Defense Language Aptitude Battery score.

An eligible officer will only be able to select one option in exchange for a three-year non-concurrent active-duty service obligation if accepting the cash option, or a 3:1 active-duty service obligation in the case of accepting the expanded graduate school program or attendance at the Defense Language Institute. Human Resources Command estimates that about 8,400 officers will be eligible to participate in this year's program.

Officers must be in the rank of captain in order to participate. Promotable first lieutenants must wait and submit upon promotion to captain, HRC officials said. They said officers in year groups 1999 through 2001 who will become promotable to major during this time frame must submit their request prior to their effective date of promotion.

If the MILPER message does not answer all of an officer's questions, additional questions can be addressed to the branch manager at HRC. Alternate means are to e-mail HRC directly at OPMDRetention@conus.army.mil or visit HRC's Web site at https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/Active/opfamdd/LDD_Home.htm.

Soldiers Look to Other Troops to Get Better Understanding of Islamic Cultures

SERGEANT BRANDON LITTLE

Military leaders say that putting faces with the monstrous machines patrolling the roads and skies of Iraq is essential to success for coalition forces. American forces go out of their way to interact with the locals and help them get a better understanding of our missions, our cultures and, ultimately, to gain their confidence.

But the training doesn't stop with the Iraqi people. Knowing that cultural understanding has to work both ways, the military continues to provide its service members with training on Islamic cultures and their way of life. But what happens after all the training and Soldiers still have questions?

Multi-National Division – Baghdad Soldiers in Task Force XII, who practice Islam, are always eager to answer questions about their religion and help fellow Soldiers put a familiar face with an unfamiliar culture.

"I've known the Soldiers I work with for a long time and they don't treat me any different just because I'm from a different culture," said SPC Emadeldeen Elboctorcy, a UH-60 Black Hawk maintainer in Company D, 3rd Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment. "They're pretty considerate of my religion; for example, when some of the Soldiers go to get food for everybody, they always make sure there is a plate without pork."

Elboctorcy, who is now a U.S. citizen, was born and raised as a devout Muslim in Alexandria, Egypt. He moved to the United States in 1995 and has been answering the questions of those curious about his religion ever since.

"When you get cultural awareness training, they only give you so much information, and many of the Soldiers, to include myself, still had questions," said 1SG Ronald Pickens, a native of Abilene, Texas, who serves with Company D. "Instead of asking their question in front of everybody, they felt more comfortable asking Elboctorcy, and he would explain his point of view. He's a very tolerant person and willing to answer those questions."

SPC Asad Khan, a New York City resident for nearly 30 years, was born in a small town near Lahore, Pakistan, and is often asked about his religion and his country's culture.

"Some people think that everyone who is a Muslim is a radical, but that's not the case," said Khan, an air traffic control systems maintainer in Company F, 7th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment. "There are a few, just like in every religion, who are extremist, but I was definitely not brought up that way."

Having cultural awareness training and a Soldier in the unit who practices Islam has helped the other Soldiers understand that different doesn't mean good or bad; it just means different, said Pickens.

"I joined the Army because I wanted to make a difference in the war using my language. But at that time, there was no military occupational specialty for Arabic linguist," said Elboctorcy, a native of Citrus Heights, California. "I guess in a sense I am making a difference, because even though I'm not out there talking to Iraqis, I'm still providing information to the Soldiers who want to know more about Arabic cultures."

"He doesn't explain how the cultures are different; he explains how the cultures are similar," said Pickens.

Islam, just like most other religions, teaches people they should love and respect one another, said Elboctorcy.

Having been born in the Middle East, Khan and Elboctorcy said they feel a connection to people who live in this region, but living in the U.S. for so many years has made them appreciate both cultures.

"I feel a strong connection to Iraqis who have dual citizenship with a country like the

1SG Ronald Pickens

SPC Emadeldeen Elboctorcy (right) talks about aircraft maintenance with another Soldier. SPC Elboctorcy hails from California but was born in Egypt and is one of the few Soldiers in his task force who practices Islam.

U.S. or Great Britain," said Elboctorcy. "We can share experiences we've had in living in both cultures and speaking both languages."

Although Khan is not yet a U.S. citizen, he has begun the naturalization process and will more than likely become a citizen before the end of his deployment.

Whether it's learning from cultural awareness training, or a Soldier who has lived in a certain region of the world, Task Force XII Soldiers have plenty of options to educate themselves on unfamiliar cultures and ways of life.

"I've never been stereotyped or judged by the Soldiers I work with; they know me and they know I'm from New York," said Khan. "Don't get me wrong, I still love Pakistan, but America has my heart and I will always be an American."

(SGT Brandon Little is a member of the Task Force XII Public Affairs team.)

WWII Unit Honored for Bayonet Attack

COLONEL (RETIRED) DOUG DILLARD

Company A, 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion conducted one of the rare bayonet attacks during World War II on January 4, 1945, against German machine gun positions in the vicinity of Dairomont, Belgium. This unit, its sister units, and their battalion earned recognition for heroism and the heavy casualties they subsequently sustained in Belgium during the closing months of World War II. This is the story of one such action, which — as has all too often been the case — was obscured by the larger and more prominent campaigns of the war.

The story of the 551st began in the state of Georgia. The personnel needed to activate the 551st were mustered at Fort

Figure 1 — Battle Route of 551st PIB from December 20, 1944, to January 7, 1945

Benning in late November 1942, and then the unit shipped out of Hampton Roads, Virginia, to Fort Kobbe in the Panama Canal Zone. Initially, the mission of the 551st and the 501st Parachute Infantry Battalions was to prepare to make a parachute assault on the French Vichy government controlled island of Martinique, which was being used to support German submarine activities in the south Atlantic. Just before the scheduled airborne assault, however, the island government pledged its allegiance to the Free French government in exile, so the mission was cancelled and the 551st returned to the U.S. for retraining and deployment to the European Theater of Operations. The 551st participated in the airborne assault in southern France in August 1944. The 501st Parachute Infantry Battalion deployed from Panama as a battalion of the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment as the regiment passed through the canal to its destination in the Pacific, where the 501st first jumped to secure Lae airfield in New Guinea.

LTC Wood G. Joerg, commander of the 551st, was a unique and energetic figure, very popular with his troopers, and he provided an example of leadership that immediately inspired many of the troopers. Under his leadership the training program in Panama inspired individualism, initiative, and the desire to accomplish the mission. On Thursdays in the Canal Zone, the battalion split into small individual elements for specialized training of their selection, so the battalion could develop any and all capabilities to operate in almost any environment. Such specialized training included light aircraft flight training, small boat handling, mechanics and locomotive operations, communications, and demolitions, all with special emphasis on the skills to sabotage enemy operations within

all of these areas. Essentially, the training provided a potential for widespread special type operations, at that time thought to be missions primarily for parachutists.

Such individual attention to development of the troopers' special talents would prove critical in their subsequent combat operations. Additionally, since many of the original paratroopers of the 501st Parachute Infantry Battalion were cadre for the 551st, a great many original developments and concepts came from the troopers jumping with the light machine gun, breaking down the 60mm mortar into sections not in bundles that could be jumped with the mortar squad personnel, use of the tether line for release and control of individual troopers' bags that could be lowered before the trooper hit the ground, and jumping of radio equipment by individuals rather than in a bundle. Finally, the unit spent lots of time in the field on squad, platoon, company and battalion exercises; the troopers were more at home in the field than in the base camp performing garrison type duties. The rigors of living in the field had become an accepted part of the battalion's normal routine.

Once on the ground in southern France, the battalion conducted a nighttime infiltration five kilometers through German lines to secure the city of Draguignan, 45 kilometers west of Cannes, the largest city in the region. This event was triggered by French Resistance reports that the German forces were planning to retaliate against the citizens of Draguignan because they had begun displaying Free French flags and initiating actions against the Germans. The 551st was ordered to immediately move into Draguignan to prevent such actions against the citizens. The 551st successfully completed the infiltration, capturing German

MG Ludwig Bieringer in his command post in Draguignan and surrounding the bunker of LTG Ferdinand Neuling, the corps commander, forcing him to surrender along with his staff, thereby dismantling the German command and control of the corps area. The capture of these key personnel facilitated the U.S. Seventh Army moving swiftly from the beaches of southern France northward for linkup with U.S. forces in northern France. For its action the 551st was awarded the French Croix de Guerre with Silver Star.

The 551st operated along the coast of southern France and in the Maritime Alps along the Franco/Italian border from September to November of 1944. The battalion then moved via train to northern France and was assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps. History records the attachment of the 551st to the 82nd Airborne Division in the Battle of the Bulge. The 551st personnel who were reassigned to regiments of the 82nd Airborne Division performed outstandingly, many becoming NCOs or promoted in enlisted grade to platoon sergeant or first sergeant positions. Even though in their hearts the 551st remained their first love, the 551st troopers immediately pledged their loyalty to the new unit.

On December 27, 1944, General James M. Gavin, commanding general of the 82nd, ordered the 551st to infiltrate 4,000 meters through German lines to attack a command post, capture prisoners and collect intelligence on German opposing forces and their defenses. This information would later aid in launching the U.S. counterattack on January 3, 1945. The 551st's bayonet attack against German positions and other heroic actions undertaken in the course of the operation are best outlined in the Presidential Unit Citation shown at Figure 2.

Today, in the area of the Battle of the Bulge where the 551st fought, there are monuments located in the towns and villages of Trois Ponts, Rochelinval, Noirfontaine, Dairomont, La Chappell and Leighnon.

Local Belgian citizens, supported by the city of Vielsam, Belgium, erected and dedicated a monument with a bronze plate attached to a granite base on February 23, 2008, at Dairomont, Belgium, the place of the attack. About 1,200 attendees from Belgium, France, Germany, Holland and England were present for the dedication. Many were WWII re-enactors who have adopted the 551st Parachute Infantry

A monument dedicated to the 551st PIB was erected in Dairomont, Belgium, the site of the unit's bayonet attack in January 1945.

Battalion as their unit, wearing the steel helmet with the 551st's distinctive symbol of a white palm tree on the helmet. The palm tree represents the unit's place of activation in the Panama Canal Zone in 1942. The dedication of the bayonet monument was related to the annual march "In the Footsteps of the 82nd Airborne Division" in the battle of the bulge. Each year, the Belgian chapter of the C-47 Club (An association of the 82nd Airborne Division Association) sponsors the march that follows the battle route of a selected regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division. This year the route of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment and the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion was selected for the march as shown in Figure 1 with battle highlights of the 551st reflected.

The following inscription best describes the bayonet action by Company A on January 4, 1945:

Dairomont, Belgium — "Company A of the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion American under the command of LT Richard Durkee conducted one of the rare bayonet attacks of World War II. The American parachutists neutralized German machine gun positions and inflicted great losses on the enemy who greatly outnumbered them. (We shall never forget their courage.)"

(COL (RET) Dong Dillard received a direct commission in the Infantry in 1948 and retired in 1977. He currently lives in Bowie, Maryland.)

Figure 2 — The 551st's Presidential Unit Citation

The 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion is cited for exceptional heroism in performance of duty in combat operations against the enemy at the beginning of the American counteroffensive in the Ardennes, Belgium, culminating in the heroic attack and seizure of the critical, heavily fortified, regimental German position of Rochelinval on the Salm River. A separate battalion attached to the 82nd Airborne Division, the 551st began its grueling days as the division's spearhead by successfully executing a raid on advanced German positions at Noirefontaine on 27 and 28 December 1944, delivering to XVIII Airborne Corps vital intelligence for the Allied counteroffensive soon to come. On 3 January 1945, the 551st from the division's line of departure at Basse Bodeaux attacked against great odds and secured the imposing ridges of Herispehe. Punished by artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire as it moved across the open, up slope terrain, the battalion lost its forward artillery observers, causing an acute lack of artillery support for its week-long push against two German regiments. On January 4, the battalion conducted a rare fixed bayonet attack of machine gun nests that killed 64 Germans. On 5 and 6 January, the 551st captured the towns of Dairomont and Quartiers, parrying the German counterattacks while often fighting hand-to-hand combat. At less than half strength, on 7 January the battalion confronted its final critical objective: Rochelinval on the Salm River. Initially repelled into a hailstorm of artillery and machine gun fire toward a high ridge of entrenched enemy, the 551st finally overwhelmed the defenders and captured Rochelinval, shutting off the last bridge of escape to the Germans in a 10-mile sector of the Salm River. The next day, January 8, Hitler ordered the German Army's first pullback from the Battle of the Bulge. In fighting a numerically superior foe with dominant high ground advantage, the 551st lost over four-fifths of its men, including the death of its inspirational commander Lieutenant Colonel Wood Joerg, as he led the last attack. Disbanded a month later, the battalion accounted for 400 German dead and took over 300 prisoners. The 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion fought with a tenacity and fervor that was extraordinary. In what United States historian Charles MacDonald called "the greatest battle ever fought by the United States Army," the 551st demonstrated the very best of the Army tradition of performance of duty in spite of great sacrifice and against all odds.

Six USAMU Soldiers Qualify for Olympic Team

PAULA J. RANDALL

Six Soldiers of the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit at Fort Benning, Georgia, won seven slots on the 2008 U.S. Olympic Shooting Team and will compete at the Olympic Games this summer.

MAJ Michael E. Anti, SFC Daryl L. Szarenski, SPC Walton Glenn Eller III, SPC Jeffrey G. Holguin and PFC Vincent C. Hancock each won a spot on the Olympic Team and SFC Jason A. Parker won two slots. The Soldiers will be competing in Rifle, Pistol and Shotgun events.

The 2008 Olympic Trials for Shotgun were conducted August 8-19 in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and March 8-16 in Kerrville, Texas. During these selection matches, Eller and Holguin each won a slot in Double Trap and Hancock got a slot in Skeet.

International Rifle and Pistol Olympic Selections were held March 1-3 in Colorado Springs and May 12-22 at Fort Benning. Anti was selected for Prone Rifle, and Parker won slots in both Air Rifle and Three Position Rifle. Szarenski took a slot in Free Pistol.

Eller beat 13 competitors to make the Olympic Team in Double Trap. Eller, 26, also competed in the 2004 and 2000 Olympics. He joined the Army in September 2006. Holguin, 29, joined the Army in September 2006 along with his friend Eller. Holguin defeated 12 competitors to get on the Double Trap Olympic Team.

In Double Trap, competitors fire their shotguns at two clay targets thrown simultaneously from an underground bunker at speeds up to 50 mph; competitors get one shot per target.

"I had the advantage of having already been a member of two Olympic Teams," Eller said.

"I also had been training with the three best Double Trap shooters in the country. I was very confident but I was completely nervous the entire time. No matter how much you prepare, it is still nerve-wracking while trying out for the Olympic Team," he said.

Hancock joined the Army Reserves in June 2006. As a junior in high school, he went through Basic Training and then returned to finish his senior year. After he graduated, Hancock went to his advanced individual training and then joined the USAMU.

The 19-year-old triumphed over 65 competitors to make the Skeet Olympic Team. In Skeet, competitors fire their shotguns at clay targets thrown from high and low houses at speeds of 55 mph.

"I had an advantage because I was preparing myself for months ahead of time," Hancock said. "I was determined to do the best I could and come out on top. I felt both confident and anxious as I was competing because it was for what I had been dreaming of since I was 12 years old."

Anti, 43, was a 2004 Olympic Silver Medalist as well a 2000 and 1992 Olympian. Anti, who joined the Army in January 1988, is attached to the USAMU through the World Class Athlete Program. The infantry officer out-shot 48 competitors to make the Olympic Team in Prone Rifle. Competitors in Prone Rifle lie

Paula J. Randall

Front row: SPC Jeffrey G. Holguin, SFC Daryl L. Szarenski, and SPC Walton Glenn Eller III; Back row: SFC Jason A. Parker, MAJ Michael E. Anti, PFC Vincent C. Hancock.

on their stomachs and shoot .22-caliber rifles at targets 50 meters away. The bull's eye is 10.4 millimeters wide, much smaller than a dime.

Parker, 33, is a 2008, 2004, and 2000 Olympian. He joined the Army in January 1997. Parker defeated 34 competitors to make the Olympic Team in Men's Air Rifle in which competitors shoot lead pellets from .177 caliber guns at targets 10 meters away. The bull's eye is 1/2 millimeter wide, the size of the period at the end of this sentence.

Parker also made the Olympic Team in Men's Three-Position Rifle in which competitors shoot the same rifles at the same targets as in Prone Rifle, except they shoot in three positions - standing, kneeling and prone.

Szarenski, 40, also competed in the 2004 and 2000 Olympics in Free Pistol. In Free Pistol, competitors shoot .22-caliber pistols from 50 meters away at bull's eye targets with an approximate 50-mm center.

Szarenski joined the Army in October 1991. After three days and 200 shots of grueling competition, it came down to the last shot, but he prevailed to beat 25 competitors and make the Olympic Team. Going into the last two shots, John Zurek was on the verge of upsetting Szarenski. However, Zurek scored 7.8 on his ninth shot in the 10-shot finals while Szarenski finished with 10.7 out of a possible 10.9 on his last shot, leaving Szarenski 1.4 points ahead of Zurek.

The Soldier-athletes are now preparing for their competitions at the upcoming Olympic Games, which will take place in Beijing, China, August 8-17.

(Paula J. Randall works for the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit, Accessions Support Brigade.)

Professional Forum

THE TASK FORCE TARGETING MEETING:
Operations Synchronization

MAJOR FRANK M. BUCHHEIT

"The targeting process focuses operations and the use of limited assets and time."
— **Field Manual (FM) 3-24,** *Counterinsurgency,* p. 5-29

Understanding the Purpose of Targeting Meetings

It is important that leaders understand the central aspects of conducting effective task force targeting meetings to be successful in combat. Unlike the traditional mind-set where fire support officers (FSO) plan targets loosely tied to maneuver plans, the targeting process in today's contemporary operating environment involves operations synchronization of all warfighting functions. Leaders must avoid separate "stove pipe" meetings that can ultimately desynchronize plans. For example, failure to incorporate sphere of influence (SOI) engagements into patrol matrices or failure to link civil affairs (CA) projects to the maneuver goal of stabilizing the area can have critical consequences.

Based on recent observations of training rotations at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) based in Hohenfels, Germany, units are clearly striving to better understand the task, purpose, and end state of the targeting process and the products yielded using the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) framework. To provide a philosophical understanding and practical application of targeting, this article explores new doctrine and evolving tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) including the F3EAD (find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate) methodology recommended by the Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group.

Targeting meetings, termed operations synchronization for the purposes of this article, must not replace the military decision making process (MDMP). The targeting process is a system that provides focus as the mission evolves over time, but where the base order mission doesn't change. This means that if the mission changes, unit planners conduct the MDMP, not targeting meetings; when units receive time sensitive intelligence, planners conduct crisis planning sessions, not targeting meetings.

The purpose of targeting meetings is to develop and refine well synchronized plans driven by *identified problem sets.* Such plans are characterized by fused intelligence with attainable objectives and clear measures of effectiveness (MOE), and are focused by the commander's intent. Plans incorporate all combat multipliers to effectively defeat the enemy, providing a safe and secure environment. This process lends itself to steady state operations where commanders are given the mission to systematically improve their owned piece of terrain over time.

The operations synchronization meeting yields several key products including fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) consisting of numerous tasks associated with the D3A framework. These tasks include directed lethal and nonlethal operations, patrol matrices, reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plans, updated information operations (IO) themes/messages with directed delivery and assessment tasks, and focused CA/humanitarian assistance (HA) projects/missions. More importantly, all units leaving the wire on missions receive directed tasks, purposes and desired end states (or desired effects to be achieved) tied to the commander's intent.

Clarifying Targeting Meeting Duties and Responsibilities

Units may overcome significant obstacles by understanding what each staff member or attendee is expected to provide at the operations synchronization meetings in terms of products and recommendations.

Commanders provide focus to their units based on their experience and ability. In the updated MDMP, commanders are more direct and intricately involved. They provide the following:

* Commander's intent,
* Priorities for the time period, and
* Most importantly, the commander is there to make decisions!

S3/Assistant S3 provides:

* Combat power/troop to task,
* Adjacent unit operations,
* Taskings from higher headquarters (route security, VIP security, etc.),
* Host nation forces operations/training schedules,
* Route clearance schedules, and
* Special operations missions.

FSO/designated civil military officer (CMO)/IO provides:

* Target synchronization matrix,
* IO themes and messages,
* SOI engagement matrix,
* Rotary and fixed wing air tasking order cycle,
* Status of current and ongoing projects, and
* Religious/cultural schedules.

S2 provides:

* Updated assessments based on significant activities

(SIGACTs) including contact by named areas of interest (NAI)/ problem area, pattern analysis, link diagrams, historical trends for the upcoming period, etc;

    * Predictive analyses to determine the most likely course of action;

    * Recommended targeting packets based on strength of evidence from all intelligence disciplines, necessity, positive identifications (PID), etc;

    * Recommended changes to priority intelligence requirements;

    * Clear serious incident reports that correspond to specific "detect" tasks required to move targets from a "no-go" to a "go" status. These reports must be based on either a PID or sufficient evidence collected in packets; and

    * Current plans for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) /recommended NAIs and changes to ISR plans.

The S2's list is the longest because intelligence drives operations. Historically, intelligence officers have been trained to analyze data and present the most likely and most dangerous courses of action, which by nature are recommendations. Well-fused intelligence recommendations are essential for successful targeting. It doesn't bode well if the S2 is no more useful than the local news report. Proper implementation of all-source intelligence and predictive analysis provides our Soldiers with synchronized plans and reasons and understandable explanations of why they are in harm's way.

The staff must come to operations synchronization meetings prepared to brief and discuss the items on the list and provide recommendations. FM 3-24 states, "Targeting in a COIN environment requires the creation of a targeting board or working group at all echelons." In most cases, units will need to use both. The targeting working group provides staff synchronization to prevent wasting the commander's time and the targeting board provides an approval brief ending with the production of FRAGOs and associated products.

Using the Target Synchronization Matrix

The functionality of the target synchronization matrix using the D3A framework can be confusing. Synchronization of effort takes more than simply projecting the Excel document and working across the chart, filling in the cells, and then adjourning to let the assistant S3 or plans officer develop the products and FRAGOs.

The D3A process seems simpler when applied to high intensity conflict (HIC) operations. For example, after receiving intelligence, a unit will **decide** where to target (AB1001). The unit emplaces an observer at OP1 to conduct a **detect** or **deliver** task. After the unit fires a battery 1 fire mission, it will **assess** the battle damage.

In COIN operations, FM 3-24 speaks directly to the four targeting activities of decide, detect, deliver, and assess. Aside from varying the sequences of activities somewhat, the process is cyclic with the challenge being placed on not only the S2, but on all staff sections to provide recommendations based on respective war fighting functions. For example, the S2 identifies the great threat from Abdul Rahman in Samarra, and the CMO identifies the mayor as the person having the most influence in Samarra.

Current steady state operations typically include conducting a relief in place where units receive initial assessments to drive operations. In other operations (such as the case in Shindand, Afghanistan) units take over new areas of operation (AO), systematically conducting village/area assessments to give commanders clear and focused recommendations of where to concentrate lethal and non-lethal troop efforts. These recommendations may include conducting initial assessments of battle space or conducting MDMP to determine required operations within new AOs. Using these staff **assessments** and recommendations, staffs can identify problem sets for their AOs, allowing commanders to **decide** on which problem sets to focus on. The next step is to array troops along areas of focus to **detect** and **deliver** effects against the identified problem sets. In a cyclic manner, the effects are again measured in follow up **assessments**.

The F3EAD Methodology

Recently, the F3EAD methodology, which has roots in U.S. Air Force and Joint manuals, has emerged as a process for targeting via the Asymmetric Warfare Group. This is an essential and effective lethal targeting process which truly excels at the operator level.

Examples Using the D3A Targeting Process

Detect Tasks:
    * Locate improvised explosive device (IED) builder YYYYY (Target 5).
    * Identify IED cell leader (NAI 3).
    * Identify additional village/tribe X pressure points to exploit success or induce cooperation.
    * Determine whether Imam (Target 2) can be influenced to cease negative mosque messages by HA/project ("carrot") or by increased coalition force presence/threat of direct action ("stick").

Deliver Tasks:
    * Raid to kill or capture individual YYYYY (Target 5) upon PID.
    * Clear NAI XX between 0500-0800 hours; Secure NAI XX from 0800-1500 hours; Ambush IED emplacers between 1500-1900 hours daily.
    * Award a primary school to village/tribe X to influence them to report on IED activities at NAI XX.

Assess Tasks:
    * Determine if the mayor of Samarra can be won over or co-opted.
    * Assess the well project in Gardez.
    * Assess the tensions of the village as a result of the previous night's raid.

This focus provides a clear task and purpose to all operations leaving the wire, which ultimately provides Soldiers confidence by answering the question, "*Why*?" In the assessment phase, commanders evaluate the feedback in terms of MOE based on the specified tasks provided to subordinate units, focusing on such points as:
    * *What feedback was gained from patrol debriefings?*
    * *What was discovered during direct actions (tactical site exploitation) to further develop the common operating picture?*
    * *What was learned during SOI engagements?*
    * *What intelligence was gained from detainees during tactical questioning?*
    * *What did the R&S plan yield?*
    * *What problems from identified problem sets were solved? Did the unit achieve the desired effects?*

COL Stefan J. Banach commanded the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division from May 25, 2005, to August 27, 2007, and coined the term "persistent surveillance" to exemplify this process of developing actionable intelligence and hitting targets. The key steps are analyzing and exploiting ground intelligence to conduct immediate follow-on operations. This process is intended to maintain the initiative instead of simply having units return to the forward operating base.

Sample Agendas for Operations Synchronization Meetings

Targeting Working Group
1. Analyze and Exploit
■ Feedback from actioned problem sets (use previous targeting board's recommended tasking story board)
    ➢ Lethal back-brief/debrief assessment
    ➢ Non-lethal back-brief/debrief assessment
■ SIGACTS
    ➢ Lethal attacks
    ➢ Non-lethal events
       o Critical changes to PMESII-PT [political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical, time] factors.
       o IO fratricide and media events (plus or minus)
■ Updated pattern analysis (use of Pattern Analysis Plot "whiz" Wheel versus map build)
■ Staff recommendations for identified problem sets
    ➢ Identified problem sets (based on pattern analysis)
    ➢ Build/submit story boards ("*make the sausage*")
2. Decide
■ S3/Plans
    ➢ Troop to task (taskings from higher headquarters)
    ➢ Adjacent/other unit events within or influencing the AO
■ XO provides the commander's pulse on issues and draws the initial cut line (such as limits for unit taskings, for example)
3. Detect, Deliver and Assess
■ Assign a clear task and purpose to all combat units and multipliers (tasks to subordinate units, ISR plans, patrol matrices, SOI engagement schedules, and patrol IO talking points cards). This may be a detect or deliver task.
■ Clearly define what is considered success and/or mission completion; what is the desired effect or end state?

Targeting Board Sample Agenda
1. Roll-up/analysis of last period (S2/3/S9/7)
☐ Show last targeting board's recommendations (story boards) and talk from each warfighting function.
  2. Intelligence updates (S2)
☐ Updated pattern analysis

☐ Specific intelligence for recommendations (problem sets)
3. Commander's decision on specific problem sets for action.
4. Story board recommendations (S3/XO) from "soup to nuts."
☐ XO/S3 briefs tasks to subordinate units
☐ S2 ISR
☐ S7 briefs IO message
☐ S5 HA or CA projects
☐ Joint terminal attack controller/FSO briefs close air support
☐ Liaison officers provide resources
5. Commander's approval/disapproval of FRAGO

Reaping the Yields from the Targeting Process
Although different staffs may have varying degrees of flexibility with regard to targeting processes, the end result must produce FRAGOs that specify deliberate tasks with corresponding purposes to units. Each FRAGO must yield the following products:
· R&S plans (locate, determine, observe, assess);
· ISR requests;
· Patrol matrices (clear, secure, kill or capture, detain, disrupt, deny, improve Iraqi security force);
· Directed action plans (raids, cordon and searches, long/mid term operations, ambushes);
· SOI engagement matrices (detect tasks, inform, influence, suppress, neutralize, co-opt);
· Updated IO themes and messages (Soldier patrol cards); and
· HA missions and directed CA projects and tasks (in the form of either assess/determine status of completion or deliver/provide a service to influence, separate, neutralize, etc.).

Successful task force commanders have learned the benefits of conducting effective targeting meetings which allow them to focus and synchronize their operations. With the goal of developing proactive units rather than reactive ones, these leaders strive to understand the purpose, characteristics, and key products generated by well synchronized plans. By understanding targeting duties and responsibilities, avoiding stove-piping of information, and embracing warfighting enablers, unit leaders may overcome significant obstacles. Through the practical application of various TTP and doctrinal targeting methodologies, commanders are able to develop and refine plans borne of well-conceived operations synchronization meetings and achieve progress and success on the modern battlefield.

MAJ Frank M. Buchheit is currently serving as a task force fire support observer controller at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany. His previous assignments include serving as troop fire support officer for 4-7 Cavalry, Korea; operations officer/liaison to other government agencies (OGA) for CJTF-180 Operation Enduring Freedom 3&4; and task force fire support officer to (3/4 CAV Squadron)TF Saber OEF 5. He was commissioned in 1997 through Indiana University of Pennsylvania ROTC.
He would like to thank LTC(P) Jody Petery, Grizzly 07, for the guidance in preparing this article and his emphasis in training maneuver task forces in the targeting process as they rotate through the JMRC.

LAND WARRIOR:
DOMINATING DISMOUNTED OPERATIONS

LIEUTENANT COLONEL W. W. PRIOR

One of the U.S. Army's mission essential tasks is to dominate land operations. Through its combat forces, it is ultimately the Army's ability to close with and destroy the enemy that allows it to dominate in decisive full spectrum operations. Such dominance springs from formations that are well trained, well equipped, well led and superbly fit. While most would agree that American combat Soldiers and units are the best we have ever fielded and the best in the world, the qualities mentioned above are necessary but not sufficient to dictate the terms and outcome of the close fight. The final requirement is information superiority.

The U.S. Army has long sought and normally achieved information superiority with the aide of technologically advanced command and control and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. However, these advanced systems and the advantages they offer have always been confined to command posts and, more recently, mounted platforms with the advent of Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). The immediate benefits of these systems ended when leaders inevitably left their headquarters or dismounted their vehicles to be forward with their Soldiers at the decisive point on the battlefield. Army leaders have never possessed a distinct advantage in information that would help them to dominate the close, dismounted fight — until now.

Land Warrior is an integrated, Soldier-worn fighting system designed to improve mobility, survivability, and lethality.

Most importantly, it provides the user with critical combat information in dismounted combat. The infantry battalion that I command has used Land Warrior fighting in Iraq for the last 10 months in every mission, every time that we go outside the wire. The accurate, timely information that we receive from Land Warrior enables my leaders and I to make better battlefield decisions and act faster than our adversaries — the essence of information superiority. Land Warrior helps us to dominate the dismounted fight in ways that we have never been able to do before.

The 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment is a Stryker infantry battalion subordinate to the 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (SBCT) from Fort Lewis, Washington. In May of 2006, the Manchu battalion was the first unit in the Army to field Land Warrior in a configuration known as Land Warrior – Stryker Interoperable (more on that subtle distinction later). For nearly a year, team leaders and above trained with the system including execution of assessments and a limited user test along with all the individual and collective training that U.S. infantry battalions conduct to prepare for combat. In October of 2006, I decided that we would take Land Warrior to war because I believed that it would increase the combat capabilities of my formation. In April 2007 we deployed to Iraq and have been employing Land Warrior with great effect in combat every day since.

In this article, I will explain what Land Warrior is and what it does. Along the way, I will present examples showing how the Manchu battalion uses the system to establish information superiority and dominate the dismounted fight in Iraq. Finally, I will propose a way ahead for Land Warrior as a component of the future dismounted force's kit.

SSG Daniel Garza of HHC, 4-9 Infantry and a member of his squad secure the site of a recent IED find.

SSG Russell Bassett

Figure 1 — Land Warrior - Stryker Interoperable

Land Warrior is, to use a favorite Army term, a system of systems. Each part of Land Warrior is designed to improve the Soldier's performance in dismounted combat while remaining an integrated component of the overall system. In other words, there are no "stand alone" parts of Land Warrior. The main components are a computer, navigation module, radio, helmet module with a display and headset and weapon module (see Figure 1). All components are connected by cables woven through the Soldier's body armor and powered by rechargeable batteries. Our version of Land Warrior is known as Stryker Interoperable because it is complementary to our vehicles. In specific, our Strykers have a kit with battery charge and storage capability and a radio gateway that permits exchange of the common operating picture and messaging between our mounted FBCB2 and the dismounted Land Warrior as well as voice communications between the respective radios.

As with most military equipment, what it does is much more important than what it is. Land Warrior provides the Manchu battalion with four distinct advantages in combat that we would not otherwise have. These advantages include dismounted situational awareness through the shared common operating picture, readily available and configurable maps and imagery, overlayed graphics with the capability to update on the move, and configurable voice and text communications.

Global Positioning System navigation tools and shared situational awareness are invaluable in the dismounted fight. Land Warrior-equipped Soldiers know where they are and where their teammates are in the dark the first time that they set foot on the terrain. No longer is there confusion on whether we are in front of building 43 or 47 or if the support-by-fire position is set. Manchu leaders look in their helmet-mounted display and see themselves and their men relative to the terrain and graphics without radio chatter and without hesitation. When posted by any user, Land Warrior leaders see enemy and environmental icons such as obstacles, suspected enemy positions, or IEDs. Furthermore, that information is automatically shared between the Land Warriors and the Strykers so that each knows where the other is and what the other knows. Land Warrior is a leap ahead in solving the age-old problem of "touch" between men and small units in the close fight. (This problem was discussed in the article "Infantry and National Priorities" by MG (Retired) Robert H. Scales in the December 2007 *Armed Forces Journal*.) With Land Warrior, Soldiers are not alone even if they do not have voice or visual contact with other Land Warriors.

Complementary to the shared situational awareness is our capability to configure and Land Warrior's capacity to carry large geo-referenced maps and imagery files. We are able to tailor those files to suit our needs. In the approach march, we may only need a 1:25 map, but the area within five kilometers of the target village may require five meter imagery. In the vicinity of the objective, we want one meter imagery for maximum clarity and detail. Since the Land Warrior view is infinitely scalable, the Land Warrior leader can zoom out to see where the adjacent platoon is then zoom in when on the target to easily distinguish first and second squad's positions in the cordon while third squad takes down the target house and weapons squad covers routes to the flank. The possibilities are limitless and this scenario is not from some future capabilities document — it is what we do today with Land Warrior.

Graphics are one of the commander's most powerful command and control tools. With Land Warrior, the commander draws his graphics on the digital map and distributes them electronically to his subordinates. There is no manual copying with accompanying errors. And, since the graphics are geo-referenced, they scale perfectly when the Soldier zooms in to imagery. A platoon leader no longer needs to tell the company commander that he has crossed a phase line. The commander can watch him do it even though he is with another platoon.

Most useful is the ability to update and change those graphics on the move. Not surprisingly, execution often differs from plan and leaders must issue fragmentary orders now as they have always done. The ability to instantly and painlessly send simple graphics with those orders over the digital network makes the unit much more flexible and adaptable in contact when the situation changes. We most often do so by posting generic colored symbols to the Land Warrior map that we affectionately call "digital chemlights." If the target house changes during infiltration, a red chemlight on the new house indicates its position to all. If the helicopter landing zone for extraction changes while on the objective, the platoon leader can place a blue chemlight on the new location and drop five or six yellow chemlights on the map to designate the route. His squad leaders see for themselves where they are going and how

the platoon leader plans to get there. Our Soldiers are limited only by their own imagination in the use of this superb tool. For instance, our SOP to mark a cleared building is a green chemlight (the physical variety) at the entry point. Manchus quickly realized that a green digital chemlight could mean exactly the same thing. Now leaders post a digital green chemlight when they clear a building and, with Land Warrior, not only can others watch them move from building to building, but all know with certainty which have been cleared and which have not.

Finally, Land Warrior provides Manchu leaders with voice communications and tactical text messaging (e-mail) over the network. Each Land Warrior system has two voice nets with which leaders can choose to talk to peers, superiors, subordinates, or Strykers. These voice transmissions are very limited in range as compared to our normal suite of FM radios, so they do not replace but augment them. Land Warrior radios do, however, provide a functional, redundant means of communications on the battlefield. Text messaging is another useful feature, although we employ it sparingly. The virtual keyboard is slow and awkward, but there have been a few occasions where dismounted Manchu leaders could see each other's icons but communicate in no other way and used text messaging to establish or reestablish contact.

The combination of situational awareness, imagery, dynamic graphics and communications at our fingertips is an incredible advantage to Manchu leaders on the streets and in the palm groves of Iraq. Land Warrior gives us the tools to make better, faster, more informed decisions and communicate those decisions to subordinates — it helps us achieve information superiority. Furthermore, since subordinate leaders have access to the same information as commanders, they are better able to exercise disciplined initiative to seize or create an opportunity. These advantages allow us to establish a tempo during dismounted operations that the enemy cannot hope to match. Land Warrior makes 4-9 Infantry a more capable and lethal organization.

In the present era of persistent, asymmetric conflict, the importance of U.S. dismounted military capability — the infantry function — has reached the point of dominance. Land Warrior is one tool that

can and does change the terms of dismounted combat giving U.S. infantry a decided edge. Naturally, then, I propose that the U.S. Army and Marine Corps continue to field Land Warrior and that we continue to seek improvements to the system.

Like any other piece of Soldier gear, Land Warrior can get better. Any addition to the infantry Soldier's load comes at a price, and the price for Land Warrior is steep. At about 12 pounds in its current configuration, the first and foremost improvement to Land Warrior must be to decrease its weight. Infantrymen in Iraq carry all of the things that infantrymen have carried for many years including ammunition, water, helmets, etc... Relatively new to U.S. forces, modern body armor has dramatically increased Soldier load and Land Warrior ups the ante further. As a personal example, I weigh about 185 pounds in my shorts but tip the scales at about 265 pounds in full kit. And, as a battalion commander, I never carry a sledge hammer, a shotgun, or an FM radio. I have no doubt that some of my Soldiers carry fighting loads close to 100 pounds at times. Like body armor, Land Warrior provides such an advantage that it is worth it. Also like body armor, we must find ways to decrease its weight so that Soldiers are physically able to exploit the advantage that it provides during sustained combat operations.

The next upgrade should be in battery size and life. Full-sized Land Warrior batteries are heavy and bulky — about the size and weight of two full 30-round magazines of 5.56 mm ammunition. Soldiers must carry at least one and often carry a spare on them. The batteries normally last about six to eight hours during continuous operations. I will not revisit weight issues addressed above, but the requirement to change batteries can also become problematic during long duration dismounted operations. As a Stryker force, recharge and storage capability on our vehicles mitigates this problem. But we need smaller, longer lasting power supplies (batteries or otherwise), and this need will become more acute if units without ready access to chargers intend to use Land Warrior regularly.

Although most combat Soldiers probably cringe a bit at the thought, each Land Warrior is really a node in a wireless network. As such, the Land Warrior network is only as strong as the wireless carrier. The limited range and performance of Land Warrior data

radios sometimes causes this network to fracture into cells, decreasing situational awareness, limiting shared information and otherwise degrading the most advantageous aspects of the system. In addition, due to its short voice range, Soldiers cannot take maximum advantage of the Land Warrior radio that they are already carrying and hence must also carry FM radios. Longer range, more reliable radios will improve the performance of Land Warrior and could decrease Soldier load by making dismounted FM radios unnecessary.

Finally, the individual weapon components of Land Warrior show promise, but must improve to make the cost of carrying them worth the benefit. The daylight video sight (DVS – think gun camera) provides full motion video with zoom capability to the helmet-mounted display. The DVS has adjustable digital reticles and can be zeroed to the Soldier's M4 or M16. This allows Soldiers to accurately shoot off-hand or "around corners." But the DVS suffers from poor resolution and low light capability. If it had better resolution and a night sight, most Soldiers would want to use it. If we could send still or video images from the camera over the wireless network, I would probably require all Manchus to use it. While the weapon components are clearly not the most important features of Land Warrior, they have inherent value that could be realized with a few modifications.

The Manchu battalion, 4-9 Infantry, has dominated the enemy in dismounted operations in Iraq with the help of Land Warrior. The combat information available to leaders through the system helps us to decide and act faster than the insurgents can match. Land Warrior could, with some improvements, provide the same advantages to the entire U.S. infantry force. Our national priorities should demand no less and our national treasure — our Soldiers — deserve no less.

A Commander's Sniper Operations Planning Guide

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID LIWANAG
CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 3 (RETIRED) MICHAEL HAUGEN

> — snip·er *noun*
> Date: 1832
> A military sniper is a shooter trained and equipped to identify and hit key enemy personnel, often from a concealed position. His targets include leaders, crew-served weapons' personnel, and artillery observers or others as directed.
> — *Infantry* Magazine

This guide is meant to provide a general planning aid to prepare, task, and maneuver snipers — the commander's scouts and hunters. It is meant for commanders and sniper employment officers who may have limited experience with snipers and their roles and missions. It is not all-encompassing and is based solely on my experience as a sniper, light infantry scout-sniper platoon leader in the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea, and as a Special Forces ODA and company commander tasked with direct action and sniper support missions.

I generically refer to the infantry sniper unit as the sniper platoon and the element leader (whether commissioned or an NCO) as the sniper platoon leader.

I attended the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit Sniper Course at Fort Benning, Georgia, as a second lieutenant in November 1982. I based my initial unit tactical employment training on the well-documented successes and experience of the 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam, as recalled by LTG Julian J. Ewell in *Sharpening the Combat Edge: The Use of Analysis to Reinforce Military Judgment* (HQDA, 1995 reprint) and *Limited War Sniping* by Peter Senich (Paladin, 1977).

The 9th Infantry Division led the Army in establishing a division sniper capability in what is generally considered the genesis of today's modern sniper teams. LTG Ewell requested the assistance of the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit at Fort Benning to build XM21 Sniper Weapon Systems specifically for the 9th Division and sniper mobile training teams (MTTs) deploying to Vietnam.

From November 1968 thru July 1969, the 9th Infantry Division's snipers totaled 1,158 sniper kills, peaking in April with 346 enemy KIA and leveling off at about 200 kills per month. LTG Ewell specifically credited battalion commander involvement for the success of the sniper program.

Snipers give the commander the ability to interdict targets and put "eyes on target" to provide real-time reporting and warning; to observe key terrain and avenues of approach and service with precision offensive, protective, and reinforcing direct fire; and/or by calling for and adjusting indirect fire on enemy units and locations.

The sniper's unique training in camouflage, concealment, and movement allow him to steal into position where he can direct supporting fires (direct and indirect) otherwise unattainable due to location and access. Snipers are a human intelligence reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) asset, formally or informally part of both the S-2's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan and the S3's maneuver and fire support plan.

Sniper planning is not an occult or dark art, but there is little doctrinal guidance. Snipers are scouts and hunters who serve as the commander's eyes before main force deployment or arrival. Lightly armed and depending on stealth for protection they cannot "secure key terrain;" however, they provide vital "on-site" intelligence for main force units, overwatch movement, and provide security throughout the mission.

The battalion commander is responsible for employing his snipers. The sniper platoon leader is designated the commander's sniper maneuver unit commander and advisor. The battalion commander specifies the supported commander with priority of support. He gives mission orders, intent, and guidance allowing sniper team leaders to prioritize targets and engagements with a clear understanding of the commander's method, purpose, and end state. He assigns operating and maneuver areas and zones to allow snipers to choose their own maneuver routes and observation and firing points. His most important guidance grants snipers

A Soldier fires a sniper rifle during a weapons familiarization course.
MCSN Zachary Hernandez, USN

SSG Sean A. Foley

A Soldier with Alpha Troop, 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, scans the rooftops in Baghdad with his sniper rifle in February 2007.

clearance to engage critical high-threat/high-value targets that meet his intent. He provides the sniper platoon leader additional assets or attachments if the mission requires augmentation.

The sniper platoon leader conducts a mission analysis based on the mission tasking and the supported commander's intent. He then conducts mission planning, task organizes, and gives operations orders to subordinate team leaders (the five-paragraph operations order and the Ranger Handbook are universal Soldier formats and resources). The sniper platoon leader coordinates with the S3 and neighboring units to reduce fratricide risk. They use the principles of patrolling to help guide their planning:
- PLANNING
- RECONNAISSANCE
- SECURITY
- CONTROL

Team leaders select tentative observation and firing positions based on map and terrain analysis and the enemy's weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and most likely and most dangerous courses of action based on template, observed, or reported reactions. The sniper team selects their own routes and final firing positions (FFPs) based on the on-the-ground sniper team leader's reconnaissance. Team leaders and planners should also check for information from other units that have operated in the area, after action reviews (AARs) and patrol reports, or from local residents or sources.

Sniper teams serve in four mission roles, limited by their dismounted mobility and vulnerability:
- ■ Scout-snipers
- ■ Sniper-observers
- ■ Hunter-killers
- ■ Fire support (direct support, general support, reinforcing)

Snipers (as dismounted light fighters) can traverse slow-go or no-go vehicle terrain balanced against mission, Soldier's load, and weather. By definition their selection of hidden, masked, or concealed routes, observation posts, and firing positions requires extra time for stealthy movement to minimize vulnerability. Snipers attached to reconnaissance and cavalry teams do not maintain sustained enemy contact. In the fire support role, sniper teams may move with main force assault, support, or security elements.

The 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam task-organized snipers into four-man sniper ambush teams with two snipers and two riflemen, one armed with an M79 and one equipped with a radio. Teams usually moved into their operating areas with an infantry squad. The Marine Corps employed two-man (shooter/spotter) teams armed with a bolt action 7.62mm M40 sniper rifle and a spotter armed with an M14.

The sniper squad was integral to the scout platoon in the H-series MTOE. Scout task organization had four 2-man sniper teams between two scout sections, and mobility and security were provided by eight M151 jeeps armed with machine guns.

A four-man team provides an optimum combination for observation, security, communications, and rest (assuming all Soldiers are adequately trained). Two snipers allow one to serve as the shooter while the other serves as the observer, rotating duties to alleviate eyestrain and fatigue. The third Soldier (a rifleman or the team leader) can also serve on shift as a sniper or observer if qualified. The fourth Soldier maintains communications with the sniper tactical operations center (TOC) and relays the team's situation reports (SITREPs) and imagery.

Sniper FFPs are manned by a two-man firing team, while the team leader and radio operator may maintain position in a concealed mission support site (MSS) offset or behind the FFP. Snipers may rest and resupply in the MSS, and the radio operator may set up antennae that will not compromise observation posts and FFPs. A single MSS may support multiple sniper teams.

Sniper teams may move to and from their operating areas attached to security squads or platoons.

The sniper team is armed with bolt action or semi-automatic 7.62mm sniper rifle systems capable of delivering consistent precision fire from 200 to 800 yards during the day and 200 to 500 yards at night (depending on illumination and conditions). Special Forces and allied forces use rifles chambered for the .300 Winchester Magnum cartridge to extend daytime range to 1,000 yards, and the .338 Lapua Magnum to extend practical range to approximately 1,200 yards.

Snipers use the .50 caliber M107 as a fire support weapon to engage enemy troops behind light cover and in light construction buildings and bunkers. Its portability gives light infantry a heavy-caliber rifle fire capability, particularly for dismounted troops in mountainous or urban terrain and buildings masked from vehicle fire support. M8A1 Armor Piercing Incendiary "Payload"

ammunition allows the sniper to engage and destroy light-skinned vehicles and materiel targets.

Precision rifles with future-potential fused night vision ("Starlight" image intensification coupled with thermal/infrared imaging technology) sniper scopes aided by infrared laser pointer-illuminators and noise suppressors give the sniper team exceptional target engagement advantage and enhance team survivability.

Each sniper team is equipped with binoculars and a spotting telescope for observation, to estimate wind velocities, and to spot shot impacts. In the scout role, optics and night vision devices coupled with laser range finders, a compass, global positioning system, and radio communications provide a powerful tool to call for and adjust indirect fires and close air support.

Sniper teams in the reconnaissance role may be equipped with a digital camera, a ruggedized laptop or notebook computer with compression software, and a digital radio to allow teams to send images of target activity and conditions to the TOC to allow the commander to "see the battlefield."

Snipers directly support the commander's need to see the battlefield and shape and form conditions to destroy and exploit enemy forces through economy-of-force. Successful sniper operations are an important part of the commander's reconnaissance, intelligence, and support fires plans.

Mission Analysis and Planning Considerations

Snipers are the most reliable intelligence tool that the on-ground commander has at his disposal — they constantly observe, memorize, record, and analyze enemy habits and routines to target and exploit their vulnerabilities. Whether in an offensive or defensive role, snipers continuously observe and assess the enemy and ground using METT-TC (mission, enemy, time, troops, terrain, civilians) and OACOK (obstacles, avenues of approach, cover and concealment, observation, key terrain) to best support overwatch, suppression, and countersniper fires balanced against concealment, survivability, and resupply or relief.

Special Forces operations are recognized for their extensive planning and rehearsals. In addition to traditional planning, Special

Forces use the aid memoire P-A-C-E to prepare plans applying to all facets of the mission from infiltration to exfiltration:

Primary - Alternate - Contingency - Emergency

Mission
Commander's Mission 2 levels up
Supported commander's mission and intent (purpose, method, end state)
Target engagement priority
PIR and IR
Rules of engagement
Reconnaissance methods
- Point reconnaissance
- Area reconnaissance
- Zone reconnaissance
- Screen
Patrolling — All patrols, by definition, are reconnaissance patrols
Reconnaissance
Raids
Ambushes (target interdiction)
Enemy
Composition, disposition, intentions
- Most likely enemy COA
- Most dangerous enemy COA
Enemy reaction times
Enemy uniform/clothing and equipment
Time
TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES
Planning
Movement and infiltration
Reconnaissance
Site selection and occupation
"Eyes on" (eyes-on-target) time
Site improvement
Estimated mission duration
Troops
Task organization
Teams
Attachments (such as forward observers and tactical air controllers)
Equipment
Camouflage and fieldcraft help the sniper survive on the battlefield, but they will not make him invisible nor impervious to weather, fatigue, active patrolling, and electronic countermeasures.
Terrain
OACOK:
- Obstacles
- Avenues of approach
- Cover and concealment
- Observation
- Key terrain
Civilians

Other Planning Factors
Control measures
Start point
Passage of lines
- Far recognition signals
- Near recognition signals
Release points
Coordination and check points
Objective rally points
Night and position marking (Identification of friend-or-foe and friendly positions)
Mission support sites
Observation posts
Final firing positions

The Sniper TOC
The sniper platoon organizes its own sniper TOC. Sniper teams report directly to the sniper TOC, (unless they are utilizing a MSS) which may or may not be located in the supported commander's TOC or intelligence center. The sniper operations sergeant battle tracks sniper team movements and positions and analyzes the status of deployed teams.

The sniper platoon leader maneuvers his teams to cover dead space, coordinates rest, resupply, and relief plans, tracks extractions and emergency displacement routes, and coordinates normal and quick reaction force reinforcement.

The sniper TOC relays SITREPs and information to the S2 and battalion and/or company TOC to update the common operational picture and to enhance the commander's situational awareness.

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CW3 (Retired) Michael Haugen served 26 years in the Army, more than 17 of which were in Special Forces. As a Special Forces assaulter and sniper, he has trained U.S. and allied Soldiers in urban combat (close quarters battle/close quarters combat) and sniper operations. He served as a sniper team leader and Special Forces company, battalion, and group sniper officer. He also served as the 1st Special Forces Group Advanced Combative Skills OIC. He is currently the director of International Military/Law Enforcement Sales for the Remington Arms Company.

GREEN TAB TO GREEN TAB FIRE SUPPORT
THE BCT COMMANDER'S BEST FIRES ASSET

MAJOR GENERAL PETER M. VANGJEL, CHIEF OF FIELD ARTILLERY

This article first appeared in the March-April 2008 issue of *Fires,* a Joint Professional Bulletin for U.S. Field and Air Artillerymen.

Six years of war against a determined enemy has presented us with a number of fire support challenges, however, it also has provided an opportunity for introspection. It is imperative that we examine whether or not our organizational and operational designs and concepts are working as originally envisioned. Under modular force design, the Army's core unit is the brigade combat team (BCT), a unit with organic enablers and capabilities that allow ground commanders to conduct operations that formerly required significant augmentation and/or task organization changes.

During my initial 100 days of command, I spent a great deal of time engaging field commanders — particularly BCT commanders — on the topic of fire support. At the Fires Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, we are committed to resolving fire support coordination and integration capability gaps that may have arisen as unintended consequences of the transformation to modularity. We must provide BCT commanders with the finest fire support system in the world and allay their concerns and confusion about who best can provide advice, Field Artillery (FA) training and certification support for lethal and nonlethal fires. Modularity has presented some unique challenges for BCT commanders in terms of scope and integration — especially in the fires warfighting function.

Unintended Consequences. The modularized BCT concept empowered the maneuver commander by placing the capability to deliver responsive fires in his operating environment *within* his formation. As with any change, however, it also created unintended consequences that may hinder his ability to integrate and coordinate fires in his area of responsibility (AOR).

One area of concern is the fire support coordinator's (FSCOORD's) role. In the past, the term "FSCOORD" was attributed to the senior commander of the firing unit supporting the maneuver commander. The FSCOORD was responsible for all aspects of fires — from coordination through delivery.

Redefined roles and missions of critical fires personnel in the BCT also have redefined the FSCOORD's position. He is now a staff officer organic to the BCT, without command authority which inhibits his ability to coordinate training and certification for subordinate battalion fire support assets.

Other areas of significant concern are fire support training,

certification and professional development. Under modularity, because fire support personnel are organic to maneuver battalions, the subordinate maneuver commanders have training, resource and oversight (TRO) responsibility for all fire support personnel in their units. It is here that the unintended consequences of modularity seem to have "struck a chord" with BCT commanders.

The following are summarized comments from BCT commanders regarding unintended consequences of modularity. Modularity placed fire support training and certification directly in the BCT commander's lap — a task that he is not trained to supervise or execute. It increased the BCT commander's span of control to the point where, because his attention is captured by other command issues, he cannot focus energy on holistic fire support training. A third consequence of modularity centers on professional development.

BCT commanders have expressed some frustration about handling the training management and leader development of their fire support assets. They realize that fire supporters are being retained in units longer than they should be due to a fear that replacements will not be forthcoming. They also are aware that, because in many cases there is no lethal or core FA mission, these adaptable Soldiers now are performing BCT-critical, non-FA functions that have been short filled by other branches, and subordinate commanders do not want to lose them. Further, the maneuver commanders are not as cognizant as they feel they should be with respect to correct assignment patterns and appropriate professional development training for their fire supporters.

Continued dialogue with active BCT commanders has reinforced that their most pressing concerns are:

1) Defining the roles and functions of the staff FSCOORD and the fires battalion commander; and

2) Addressing who best can provide fire support professional development, training and certification.

As BCT commanders experience these issues, I continue to receive inquiries from the field. Among them are: "What should I expect from my FSCOORD? What role does he play with my staff? With my other battalion commanders? How much advice is he capable of giving? What role should my fires battalion commander fulfill? Isn't *he* the senior fire supporter in my brigade? How can I best take advantage of his special skill set for the good of the formation?" These are logical questions and concerns, and it is instructive to examine our doctrinal sources for guidance and consideration before making recommendations.

FSCOORD. The BCT FSCOORD executes critical fires tasks for the BCT commander. Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat*

Figure 1 — The FSCOORD's Responsibilities as Outlined in FM 3-90.6

Team, defines the BCT FSCOORD as, "...the special staff officer responsible for BCT fires, which include Army indirect fires and joint fires. He advises the BCT commander and staff on all aspects of indirect fires planning, coordination and execution in support of BCT operations. He assists the BCT S3 to integrate fires into the maneuver commander's concept of operation." Figure 1 lists some of the BCT FSCOORD's responsibilities.

Similarly, *Joint Publication 3-09 Joint Fire Support,* dated 13 November 2006, defines the U.S. Army FSCOORD as "... the senior Field Artillery (FA) officer permanently assigned as the full-time fire support staff advisor to the commander and staff. The FSCOORD performs all the staff functions associated with fire support."

There is no specific mention of the experience level or qualifications of the BCT FSCOORD lieutenant colonel (LTC) assigned to the position. Based on current assignment priorities, patterns and the fact that the demand for FA LTCs far exceeds the inventory, the reality is that a LTC serving as a staff BCT FSCOORD will be the *exception* rather than the rule. BCT commanders should anticipate that this position likely will be filled by an FA major. Ideally, he will have served as a fires battalion operations officer or executive officer and be an intermediate-level education (ILE) graduate, but even that is not assured. Thus, the experience level of the officer assigned to the BCT FSCOORD position ensures an able staff officer, but may not provide an experienced leader to cultivate the fire support advisor relationship that a BCT commander desires.

Fires Battalion Commander. The fires battalion commander executes a number of critical tasks for the BCT commander. The

fires battalion commander controls all the tactical, logistical, administrative and training activities of the fires battalion. He directs employment of the battalion in accordance with assigned missions from the BCT commander. Figure 2 lists some of the fires battalion commander's duties.

The fires battalion commander can serve also as a maneuver battalion commander when directed by the BCT commander. While this utilization augments BCT capability on the ground, it does not eliminate the requirement for effective fire support advice.

In addition, the fires battalion commander should assist the BCT commander with personnel management and leader development for FA Soldiers and leaders within the BCT. The fires battalion commander is uniquely aware of professional development "gates" and timelines for Artillerymen and can help the BCT commander assign leaders to various developmental jobs.

A thought for the BCT commanders — in terms of leadership experience, the fires battalion commander has been selected by a Department of the Army board. It is most probable that he has served as a fire support officer at some level from company to division and has acquired the requisite brigade and higher-level fire support experience in previous assignments. He is not simply a peer battalion commander within the brigade, but one with a special skill set

— he is an expert in lethal and nonlethal fires integration and coordination. He brings other assets and skill sets to the table to help the BCT commander solve current "fire support training gaps" identified by a number of BCT leaders. He would be my recommendation as the BCT commander's personal fire support advisor.

Addressing Training and Certification Gaps. In examining the functions of the FSCOORD and the fires battalion commander, we see that neither has TRO responsibility for fire support personnel within the brigade. It appears that the staff FSCOORD will be unable to perform this task in the foreseeable future. His newly assigned nonlethal tasks and duties will demand all of his available time. In my view, the best asset to resolve this gap is the fires battalion commander. He has a staff, assets and resources to execute effective training. Of course, the BCT commander will need to emphasize the importance of fire support training to his subordinate maneuver battalion commanders, but it seems logical for a BCT commander to synchronize and consolidate fires system training under a single commander who answers directly to him.

At least 10 BCT commanders have conveyed to me that they are considering consolidating the FA fire support assets either at the BCT headquarters and headquarters company level or giving them directly to the fires battalion for training and oversight. Such a situation certainly would enable better fire support training, but the

Figure 2 — Some Duties of the Fires Battalion Commander from FM 3-09.21, *TTPs for the Field Artillery Battalion*

commander would need to ensure that his fires battalion commander clearly understands that *support to maneuver battalion commanders is his first priority*. Because the BCT commander now owns all the assets in question, his guidance will be followed.

An added benefit is that the fires battalion commander, as a "green tabber," is experienced and, therefore, can provide the higher-level fire support perspective and advice that the BCT commander needs and desires.

Under modularity, the staff BCT FSCOORD *should* be the senior FA officer within the brigade, but current inventory and personnel management priorities cannot support this concept. So who should the BCT commander look to for advice on fires matters? *FM 3-90.6* offers us an opening: "The fires battalion commander is no longer the BCT fire support coordinator (FSCOORD). *The BCT Commander must clearly define the roles of his fires battalion commander and his staff FSCOORD*, and ensure that they clearly understand their respective responsibilities."

In the foreseeable future, the fires battalion commander, without question, will be *the* fire support expert within the BCT. He is a centrally-selected commander, often with sufficient experience to function as the BCT commander's indispensable right hand for fires. He also has a number of other assigned tasks related to the employment of a fires battalion that lend themselves to effective fire supporter training, certification and professional development. He is a valuable tool for the BCT commander with a critical skill set who can help with fires integration, coordination and execution.

A strong interactive relationship between the BCT commander and his fires battalion commander is paramount. It must be based on confidence and competence — a relationship in which the fires battalion commander enables the maneuver commander to dominate his AOR through the effective application of both lethal and nonlethal fires.

Our fires battalion commanders are self-assured in their abilities and willing to help the BCT commander manage fires across his AOR. The fires battalion commander must be "that guy" on whom

> **It is critical that we also receive input from our many respected maneuver leaders who can help us frame the issues because, ultimately, we are the maneuver commanders' 24/7 fire support force.**

everyone can rely for all matters related to fire support. The fires battalion commander should be responsible for the fires warfighting function within the BCT. He should be accountable to the BCT commander to ensure all lethal and nonlethal fires assets and organizations are trained and proficient. To that end, we at the Fires Center of Excellence will ensure we provide current and cogent training on lethal and nonlethal fires application and integration to future fires battalion commanders so that they are competent and confident in their roles as the BCT commander's primary fires advisor.

This is an excellent topic for discussion, and I have included it in our agenda for the Fires Seminar in June. The theme for the conference is *"Artillery Strong: Challenges and Opportunities in an Era of Persistent Conflict."* I know that all FA leaders will arrive well prepared to discuss innovative solutions to a number of issues regarding the branch.

If you have insights to share, please visit the Fires Knowledge Network Web site at **https://www.us.army.mil/ suite/page/130700**, and provide your thoughts so that we can capture them for use during the Seminar. It is critical that we also receive input from our many respected maneuver leaders who can help us frame the issues because, ultimately, we are the maneuver commanders' 24/7 fire support force. *Anticipate – Integrate – Dominate! Artillery Strong!*

MG Peter M. Vangjel is the Chief of Field Artillery. He previously served as the Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 in Washington, D.C. His complete bio can be viewed online at sill-www.army.mil/USAFAS/MG_Vangjel.htm.

2008 Fires Seminar To Be Held June 3-5

The 2008 Fires Seminar will be held at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, from June 3-5.

The theme for the seminar is "Artillery Strong: Challenges and Opportunities in an Era of Persistent Conflict." The conference will focus on two subject areas: leader development and the integration and coordination of fires in the contemporary operational environment.

Joint, allied, retired, active and Reserve Component senior leaders of the Army Air Defense Artillery and Field Artillery and Marine Corps Field Artillery should receive invitations via e-mail. Invitees who haven't received an e-mail invitation may contact the Seminar Support Center at atzr-cva@conus.army.mil. Information about the seminar is available at **www.mhli.org/fortsill2008**.

A Soldier pulls the lanyard on the M-777A2 during the first firing of the Army's new GPS-guided Excalibur round February 25 at Camp Blessing, Afghanistan

Photo by SGT Henry Selzer

A DEADLY COMBINATION:

Integration of the AH-64D M-TADS and High Altitude Tactics on the Modern Battlefield

CAPTAIN A. C. SCHILLECI

"The fielding of the Modernized Targeting and Acquisition Designation Sensor (M-TADS) has changed the way we fight and has given our unit a level of effectiveness that we believe will alter all attack reconnaissance battalions."

> — CW4 Gerald E. Adams and LTC David M. Fee
> "MTADS - More Than Just a Sensor," *U.S. Army Aviation Center Tactics Division Newsletter*, February 2007

Some might read the preceding quote and arrive at the conclusion that all Apache battalions exude an unfounded level of arrogance. One might even question if any single attack aviation unit can even make a significant contribution to [the progress of] the global war on terrorism. To the surprise of many, the integration of the Lockheed Martin Arrowhead® M-TADS/PNVS (Pilot Night Vision Sensor) into the AH-64D Longbow Attack Helicopter platform has established technological advancements and has significantly shifted the inherent realities of combat in which we now fight.

What has been proven during the last Operation Iraqi Freedom deployment (06-08) is that the application of M-TADS high altitude tactics (HAT) must be more effectively integrated into attack helicopter (AH) operations to improve the current methods of AH employment, enhance aircrew survivability, and exploit known inherent insurgent vulnerabilities.

Current AH-64D Employment Methods

Longbow aircrews are trained within the parameters of the Aircrew Training Manual (ATM). The ATM has drawn from many historical lessons that influence the fundamental attack aviation tasks within. Credence has been specifically traced to the successful AH-1 tactics utilized while flying and fighting in the jungles and hills of Vietnam. Still 40 years later, the primary method in which aircrews plan tactical missions stem from the fundamentals of the ATM Task 1408, "Perform Terrain Flight."

Performing Terrain Flight. ATM Task 1408 is divided into two subtasks that maintain the standards for terrain flight. The first, terrain flight modes (contour, low-level, and nap of the earth [NOE] flight), describes the different aircraft altitudes and movement considerations to the earth's surface enroute to target areas in which AHs are utilized.

Employment of Techniques of Movement and Principles of Overwatch. *Techniques of Movement and Principles of Overwatch,* (traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch) are designed to capitalize on the maneuverability of helicopters while employing the fire and maneuver concept.

This primary task is introduced to fledgling attack pilots during initial training at Fort Rucker and hammered home once the aviator reaches his/her operational attack reconnaissance battalion (ARB). Joint doctrinal considerations applied to attack aviation employment in the current urban combat environment also remain tied to the traditional low-level mind-set. For example, a typical rotary-wing urban flight profile consists of modified low-level and contour techniques. In order to establish a foundation for employing attack

helicopters in support of the missions in the contemporary operating environment (COE), we need to change the "low and fast" mind-set.

Lack of High Altitude Training in Current Doctrine. Conversely, during no time in flight school or during a readiness level progression will a new gun pilot find any ATM standardized task for "Perform High-Altitude Flight." This specific tactical task, which has proven to be the new foundation of success for attack aviation operations in executing the war on terrorism; is missing from the current AH-64D ATM, dated September 2005.

This startling fact has not gone unnoticed. Senior–level Army Aviation leadership and the Department of Army Aviation Evaluation and Standardization (DES) have begun to take note of this critical gap in our mission-focused curriculum and Aircrew Training Program. There has been some stunning headway made in implementing these combat-tested lethal tactics.

"Overall, the M-TADS allowed our unit to progress at a faster rate than a legacy TADS," said CW4 Adams and LTC Fee.

Aircrew Survivability

"Years of intensive training, institutional knowledge, and safety procedures have prepared our pilots to be the best low-level pilots in the world. When combat requires that they change their tactics, however; that mind-set can become a fatal attraction."

— COL Jim Slife
"Shootdown Survival," *Armed Forces Journal*, June 2007

The insurgent enemy has once again influenced the undercurrents of attack aviation tactics. These currents are driven by the many methods [ranging from ingenious to rudimentary] in which the enemy chooses to apply friction on the battlefield.

"To operate in a low-altitude environment, an attack weapons team (AWT) must beware of essentially six threats: terrain, wires/power lines, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), small arms/light machine guns and Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)," said COL Slife in his article.

To overcome this barrage of natural/man-

made obstacles and the inherent danger of low-level flight, high altitude tactics have now statistically been proven to be the necessary answer.

Safer to Fly Higher? Varying degrees of increased altitudes are correlated with the mitigation of potential threats. Above ~500 feet, obstacle avoidance is accomplished. Climb to 1,500 feet and RPGs become out-ranged. Still higher, to 3,000 feet and the probability of hit (Ph) of a small-arms (7.62mm AK-47) or light machine gun (12.7 DsHK) weapon system becomes dramatically reduced, according to COL Slife.

The idea of flying higher to conduct aviation combat operations in an urban environment in the Joint world is also unrealistically documented and skewed. FM 3-06.1, MCRP 3-35.3A, NTTP 3-01.04. AFTTP(I) 3-2.29 — *Aviation Urban Operations Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations* — states, "To buffer obstacle and hazard clearance, a higher flight altitude over a city, day or night may be necessary." This altitude range (300 to 500 feet AGL) places aircraft in the effective engagement envelopes of ALL weapon systems currently in the OIF/OEF theatres of operations. If an AWT crew (AH-64D or AH-1W) were to follow this planning guidance, the results could be an absolute disaster. In the December 14, 2007, *Defense Update News Analysis* article "Deadly Scourge of the U.S. Helicopter Pilots in Iraq" by COL David Eshel and BG Robert "Boomer" Milstead, a Cobra pilot who recently returned from commanding a Marine aircraft wing in Iraq said, "Above about 2,500 or 3,000 feet, you are out of small arms range, by all means avoid 500 to 1,000 feet because you're hanging out there like a grape, to be picked!"

Leading the M-TADS HAT

Transformation. There are attack reconnaissance battalions emerging that have begun the process of integrating HAT fundamentals to preserve combat power, mainly through tactical lessons learned in theater and many airframes sustaining battle damage. The 1-82 ARB, "Wolfpack," returned from OIF rotation 06-08 and is leading the shift in M-TADS HAT employment. The following statement from the article "MTADS- More Than Just a Sensor" supports the application of high-altitude tactics for the sole reason of aircrew survivability: "We flew low and fast to try to avoid taking fire. In the first three months of OIF, we had 12 aircraft shot; all at 400 feet and below and none at 1,000 feet and above."

Exploiting Insurgent Vulnerabilities

As stated in Chapter 1 of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, the eight highlighted insurgent vulnerabilities are:

- ☐ Insurgents' need for secrecy,
- ☐ Inconsistencies in the mobilization message,
- ☐ Need to establish a base of operations,
- ☐ Reliance on external support,
- ☐ Need to obtain financial resources,
- ☐ Internal divisions,
- ☐ Need to maintain momentum, and
- ☐ Informants within the insurgency.

Realistically, these vulnerability tenants are tailored to be interpreted by a ground force commander (GFC) and when applied, support his scheme of maneuver. However, the M-TADS at high altitudes can effectively be just the precision weapon the GFC needs to properly leverage his air assets.

M-TADS= The Answer. The major factor enabling the 1-82 ARB to employ high altitude tactics so effectively was the

Figure 1 — Lockheed-Martin Arrowhead

Lockheed-Martin Arrowhead Information Paper

M-PNVS turret
(Pilot sight)
• FLIR sensor

M-TADS turret
(Copilot/Gunner sight)
•FLIR sensor
•Day TV
•LRFD
•LST

System	SA-7	SA-14	SA-16	SA-18
Warhead (WH)	.37 kg HE/FRAG	1 kg HE/FRAG	2 kg HE/FRAG	2.5 kg HE/FRAG
(WH) Initiation	contact/graze	contact/graze	contact/graze	laser prox fuse w/in 5m
Range (max)	4200m	4500m	500-5000m	500-6000m
Altitude (max)	2300m	3000m	3500m	10-3500m
Sensor	IR homing	IR homing	passive IR/UV	passive IR/UV
Self-destruct	15 seconds	14-17 seconds	14-17 seconds	14-17 seconds
Max speed (mps)	500 mps	520 mps	400 mps	400 mps

http://defense-update.com

Figure 2 — MANPADS Capabilities Chart

introduction of the M-TADS. The M-TADS/PNVS provides the aircrew a clear second generation forward looking infrared (FLIR) image at ranges greater than eight kilometers (See Figure 1).

This never-seen-before stand-off capability is precisely why and how the Wolfpack was able to climb to safe altitudes in the Salah al Din and Diyala provinces and account for approximately 40 percent of the 25th Infantry Division's enemy battle damage assessment. The level of combat power unleashed by the capability of the M-TADS not only provided 25th ID senior leadership a tremendously deadly maneuver asset but also significantly increased the levels security and safety for the forces on the ground.

Limitations with Current Methods. The inherent limitation of being in the sky, unable to feel and absorb the intangibles of urban ground combat has been a reality check for attack pilots. Until now, the lack of FLIR image clarity provided by the legacy TADS attributed to gaps in pilot's situational awareness of the forces below. When flying at altitudes above 2,500 feet, the M-TADS provides the aircrew the ability to observe enemy vehicle/weapon types, facial expressions, body language and the actual wires used by insurgents to trigger improvised explosive devices. One aviator assigned to Task Force Wolfpack said, "Our experience in OIF with respect to acquiring and engaging the bad guys and with the M-TADS is seriously like cheating!"

Counterarguments: (M-TADS and High Altitude Tactics)

Although there are many advantages to applying the HAT concepts to Army attack aviation, there are some intrinsic issues of concern. First, when operating at these high altitudes, the most dangerous and prevalent threat to an AWT becomes MANPADS. Currently in theater, AH aircrews face a variety of these weapons systems ranging from the Vietnam-era SA-7 Grail to its successor, the IR homing SA-14 Gremlin. More hazardous still, is the UV/IR/ two-color guided SA-18 (See Figure 2).

What About Tomorrow? A shift to the conventional battlefield would include a high probability of facing integrated air defense systems and much more definitive enemy personnel and equipment. In this scenario, the capabilities of the MTADS would still be extremely effective in attack and reconnaissance mission sets. However, the employment of HAT would doctrinally be postponed until the enemy is neutralized and friendly air superiority is achieved.

Another potential pitfall that the AH community must also avoid is the propensity to focus all or a majority of a unit's training around the contemporary operating environment. Mission planning for battle position and deep attack operations must remain sharp for the next significant conventional threat.

Due in large part to the COE, the disconcerting trend of disregarding large-scale anti-armor mission employment considerations can be the sign of a future Achilles heel for attack aviation.

The AH community must combine the fundamental tank killing successes achieved in Operation Desert Storm with the insurgent exploitabiiity learned and gained in OIF/OEF with the M-TADS. Once this evolution is completely implemented and properly standardized throughout Army attack aviation, the ability to surgically strike our future armored enemies becomes limitless.

In Conclusion

The Army attack community must continue efforts to standardize HAT into our aircrew training program to properly integrate the recent concepts and lessons learned. The staggering achievements experienced when employing the M-TADS in combination with HAT are all the evidence needed to take particular note and standardize this deadly combination.

The senior leaders (commissioned and warrant officer) will need continual exposure to these jaw-dropping concepts and success stories. Surprisingly, even in the tightly knit Apache Longbow community, the recent exploits of the M-TADS are mythical and some of the claims deemed unbelievable. However, the strides currently being made in the Army's DES coupled with the support of some key influential decision makers are already beginning to modernize our communities' view on the M-TADS HAT combination.

This progress will certainly enable further advancements and developments in risk mitigation to improve aircrew survivability. Additionally, with more pilots flying the M-TADS in conjunction with HAT daily, the amount of intelligence gathered to capitalize on exploiting the now visible weaknesses of our insurgent enemies will only improve the future of our tactics and community.

CPT A. C. Schilleci is an AH-64D aviator and is currently attending the USMC Expeditionary Warfare School at Quantico, Virginia. He was commissioned in 2001 from the UCLA ROTC program. After graduating flight school, he was stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from 2003 to 2007 with the 3rd Battalion, 229th Aviation Regiment (Attack) and 1-82nd Attack Reconnaissance Battalion, respectively. His most recent deployment was with 1-82nd ARB (Wolfpack) for OIF 06-08. In July, he is set to return to the 1-82 ARB for company command.

OPSEC KEY TO CURRENT, FUTURE OPERATIONS

CAPTAIN TIMOTHY HSIA

The world today is indeed flat. It is possible now to quickly disseminate and share information globally in seconds rather than days. On today's battlefield, any Soldier or insurgent can collaborate with his comrades across the globe in real time to influence or alter future decisions. If intelligence drives operations, then it is paramount that the U.S. military conceal its intelligence capabilities. The digital boom of the past 15 years is considered a blessing for the majority of people in the world; however, it also poses a unique operational security (OPSEC) threat. Today's military leaders in the Middle East face a difficult conundrum concerning how to reduce OPSEC vulnerabilities when planning and executing future operations. The threat the military faces in terms of OPSEC ranges from the profundity of open source information readily available to the problems arising from joint operations can no longer be overlooked as our enemies actively seek to gain the upper hand by closely monitoring our activities.

Military leaders have come to realize that globalization has allowed Soldiers to quickly relay information to family members back home by posting thoughts on chat rooms and activities on personal blogs. Today, a common joke deployed Soldiers share is the fact that spouses "back in the rear" are probably more discerning of future operations in the unit than they are. The amount of open source news that anyone can retrieve from the internet is simply staggering. Anyone from insurgents to interested family members can essentially create a link diagram of key leaders within a unit. They can read biographies, past assignments, accomplishments, and quotations of leaders from platoon leader and above. Essentially, on the internet there exists an asymmetric amount of information which the enemy can collect on U.S. military units in comparison to the dearth of information we can research about the insurgents we are fighting. Interested observers do not have to be in the unit to know when a unit has displaced. All they have to do is scour the internet and read the latest open source reports regarding the unit in question.

OPSEC has long been a concern of military commanders and the rapid growth of information technology has only exacerbated it. Even GEN Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe in World War II, and the planners of the invasion of Normandy practiced OPSEC. GEN Eisenhower was perhaps fortunate that his Soldiers did not have access to the internet or phones. Imagine today an operation of that magnitude and whether or not the enemy would be able to clue in on

A Soldier with the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division uses a radio during a joint mission in Iraq February 8.

SPC Angelica Golindano

American intentions. Even the simplest hints to loved ones such as, "I won't be calling home for a couple weeks, we are really busy" to "we are practicing loading and unloading boats for what I can only guess is a beachhead invasion" can have disastrous effects. But the truth today is that such information can be instantaneously leaked. It is foreseeable that in the future it may not only be the enemy with his bayonet greeting the U.S. military at the beachhead, but also the media with its cameras. The consequences of this information being leaked would be unpardonable. However, this possibility now exists today as deployed Soldiers unwittingly pass sensitive information to loved ones back home. The military mantra that "every Soldier is a sensor," is intended to imply that every Soldier is an intelligence collection node. In this case, however, the sensor is also an emitter.

OPSEC has become further diminished as intimate relationships have developed between embedded media and senior service members. These relationships between the media and the military require a deep level of trust and understanding. The same journalist that is discussing matters off the record with a division general could possibly be doing the same with key leaders of the insurgency the next day. How far does the military desire to publicly reach out to the fourth estate, and at what point does a military commander decide to evade answering further questions and refrain from volunteering additional information? The case of Geraldo Rivera leaking military plans about a future operation by showcasing a terrain model on the news is not an anomaly. The military has opted to allow for transparency in order to paint a more complete portrayal of the U.S. military. But at what point does transparency work against the military? Is the military today sacrificing the element of surprise for the chance to better its public relations? Units in Iraq today often find themselves with an abundance of media personnel right before the initiation of a major operation. This is not merely a coincidence as news reporters have stated that they indeed have been told about the pending operation. Thus, the onus on maintaining OPSEC resides not only at the rifleman level but also at the senior military commander level.

The military's dependence on contractors, U.S. and foreign, also has heightened the OPSEC dilemma. Contractors on military bases in Iraq are often the first to realize that military units are being moved. In this regard they are often the most attentive individuals on the forward operating bases because their jobs usually involve life support functions such as housing and transportation. Contractors do not consist of solely patriotic Americans but are mostly foreign contractors whose intentions and values may not always align with America's military. Like deployed Soldiers, these local and third country nationals possess numerous ways to contact the outside world: cell phones, satellite phones, and internet access. Information they intentionally or unintentionally relay to friends and family across the globe has the potential impact of greatly affecting how America's enemies respond to our operations. Given this situation, it is very difficult if not impossible to achieve complete surprise against the enemy for units operating within Iraq.

Joint operations also pose a threat to OPSEC, especially if our partners are Iraqi. It is well known that some elements of the Iraqi Security Forces have been infiltrated by insurgents. Anytime U.S. forces conduct combined operations with their Iraqi counterparts they must share information and synchronize execution at the lowest levels. It is easy to imagine how such operations could be compromised purposely by enemy infiltrators or accidentally through carelessness on either side. Further compounding the problem is that Iraqi units simply do not have secured communication. Iraqi units rely on commercial cell phones, or worse, unsecured walkie-talkies at the tactical level. The problem is further compounded at the strategic level, when Iraqi officials announce publicly future joint operations in a certain region to the chagrin of tactical commanders who are planning to have the element of surprise when moving into a certain region.

In the future, the U.S. military must be extremely vigilant at concealing its hand in operations. OPSEC is a problem that will only exponentially increase in complexity as the digital revolution expands and as technology spreads outward from the western world to third world countries where future combat operations could occur. As today's operations in Iraq suggest, the digital revolution in information technology is one of the few areas where the U.S. military does not hold a distinct advantage over its adversaries. Tomorrow's adversaries will be less forgiving of our leaked intelligence and the consequences of compromised OPSEC will be far more deadly.

CPT Timothy Hsia is an infantry officer assigned to the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment.

RANGER
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LEAD THE WAY

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
TEAM FROM 75TH RANGER RGT WINS 2008 BRC

A bove, on April 20 the top three teams cross the finish line of the 2008 Best Ranger Competition at Fort Benning, Georgia. From left to right are SSGs Michael Broussard and Shayne Cherry of the 75th Ranger Regiment, who placed first; CPT Jeff Soule and MAJ Greg Soule, who took second place and represented James Madison University ROTC; and SGT Jeremy Billings and SFC Jeremiah Beck, who took third representing the 75th Ranger Regiment.

This year's field of competitors included almost 30 teams from force generating units in Training and Doctrine Command to operational units from Forces Command, and both active and reserve components.

The 2008 Best Ranger Competition core events involved foot movement, engaging and destroying an enemy target, evaluating, treating and evacuating a casualty, and the demonstration of physical and mental toughness. Upon completion of the three-day competition, during which no sleep was scheduled, each Ranger team moved in excess of 60 miles, with equipment, and fired nearly 250 rounds of ammunition using multiple weapons.

(Information provided by Fort Benning Public Affairs.)

Above right, the 2008 BRC winners SSG Michael Broussard and SSG Shayne Cherry hoist the pistols they won during the BRC awards ceremony. (Photo courtesy of TheBayonet.com)

At right, SSG Jeremy Cook makes his way up the 80-foot rock climb on the second day of the competition. (Photo by J.D. Leipold)

At left, a BRC competitor negotiates the water confidence course during day 3 of the competition. (Photo courtesy of TheBayonet.com)

CULTURAL AWARENESS AND THE ARMED FORCES

KIRSTEN SANDERS

As a leader among the nations of the free world, the United States has established a presence in virtually every nation on the face of the earth. In many lands, our diplomatic representation is complemented by a concomitant military presence, which has introduced members of the armed forces into foreign lands and exposed them to cultures and customs far different from our own. The military has long understood the importance of knowing as much as possible about its adversaries, but with recent and ongoing deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and other Middle Eastern countries the need for detailed, comprehensive knowledge has become both an issue of national security and a national priority.

Although our Soldiers and their leaders are typically briefed on the cultural pitfalls of deployment to other lands, since the outset of the global war on terrorism (GWOT) our military doctrine and training have devoted far more time, effort, and assets to expanding Soldiers' cultural awareness skills than ever before in our Army's history. According to LTC William D. Wunderle, author of *Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for U.S. Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries*, cultural awareness can reduce battlefield friction and the fog of war. It can also improve the armed forces' ability to accomplish their mission by providing insight into the intent of the groups operating in the battle space, thereby allowing the military to get inside an adversary's decision cycle and outmaneuver him. In like manner, Wunderle asserts that an understanding of culture and society is also critical in post conflict stability, peacekeeping, and nation building, which in many instances require an extended commitment of forces and assets in foreign nations.

Being culturally aware means that we recognize that we — friend and foe alike — are all shaped by our cultural heritage. This influences how we interpret the world around us, how we perceive ourselves, and how we relate to others. More importantly, it enables us to better understand those unique factors of history, religion, geography, and the local economy that shape an indigenous population. And military commanders are increasingly becoming aware of the critical link between cultural intelligence and our success in the contemporary operational environment. The U.S.

Soldiers with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) talk with an Iraqi man during a foot patrol April 29.

SGT James Hunter

Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is currently working on implementing extensive training on cultural awareness at all levels across military installations, and especially among those tasked with the training of Soldiers. On a basic level, the training is teaching military commanders and Soldiers how to not only more effectively complete their missions, but also offers ways to carry out missions within a cultural context that heightens judgment and interaction within foreign lands. Some of the things that Soldiers learn are how to better identify the leaders and centers of influence within Muslim society.

It is also important to grasp the concept of families, clans, and tribes, and the factors and loyalties that cause them to react in certain ways. We are also attempting to clarify for our Soldiers and leaders the differences between such religious factions as the Sunnis and Shiites, and which may pose a threat to operational success at any given time. Taking time to socialize — typically perceived by us as nonessential — is a key element of social interaction with the Arab world. By getting to know the local population, we may earn respect and build the bonds that establish our — and their — credibility and future approachability. Within the Arab culture, alliances and allegiances are very important. Arabs are typically loyal to their code of honor and dedicated to their tribe, clan, and family. Their primary concern is that which affects their immediate circle. To lessen hostility Solders are briefed to speak to locals and smile (In Arab culture, a straight face is viewed as being hostile and a smiling face is deemed as friendly). Respecting elders is also a lesson learned in recent years. When entering into villages, units have found heightened success in acknowledging the elders and consulting them for advice and/ or support in cultural relations and operations. Acknowledging their presence creates an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect — a task that will inevitably take time; however, with armed forces depending on the know-how and insight of the general populace, gaining trust is a critical element in overall intelligence gathering and an effective weapon on and off the battlefield.

An issue common to military transition teams, other U.S. Soldiers in advisory roles, and any Soldiers or leaders tasked with meeting with local leaders is the fact that every member of the team must embrace the

MC2 (AW/SW) Sandra M. Palumbo, USN

Soldiers with the 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, speak with Iraqi men in Diwaniwah.

mission and be prepared to accept the local cultural norms. Foods and eating habits in the Arab world are often widely different from our own, and if one member of the team grimaces or mutters something about the dinner we may well have lost the game then and there. This is a matter of discipline; the leader sets the example and his subordinates follow. An important point: we cannot ever assume that the locals do not understand English. Any foreign language instructor will tell you that one's passive understanding of a language always exceeds his active conversational ability, and the smirk or body language that accompanies a derogatory comment will speak volumes on its own.

The importance of cultural awareness is not limited to those regions where we are actively involved in prosecuting the global war on terrorism. It has relevance wherever and whenever Americans — military or civilian — routinely interface with peoples and cultures of other nations. Whether we are questioning Iraqis about their water, electricity, and transportation infrastructure or preparing to close a business deal with Chinese investors, our understanding of whom we are dealing with will pay dividends. The dividends we may achieve in the GWOT include an ability to predict enemy courses of action, greater predictability of his goals and how he hopes to attain them, a more accurate assessment of his motives and how to affect these, and a significantly improved ability to gather and assess the human intelligence that is the

cornerstone of any counterinsurgency.

The GWOT is an evolutionary conflict, and our enemies are skilled in their use of information operations. They know how to exploit both regional and international media to their advantage, and we must not miss a chance to defeat them at their own game. We need to heighten our own sensitivity toward operational security (OPSEC), because Al Qaeda and its surrogates are skilled at gleaning intelligence from our own blogs, individual Web sites, media, and open source documents, and we cannot afford to give them anything they can use against us. Cultural Awareness should continue to be an integral component of Soldiers' formal training and cultural framework. The United States and its quest for cultural awareness can be equated to a contemporary battlefield — if it is not strategically navigated with precaution, awareness and respect, our efforts can produce unforeseen repercussions and long-lasting detrimental effects. By thoroughly training and preparing Soldiers for deployment and by continued this training in theater, we can be sure that the vital combat multiplier of cultural awareness can contribute to winning the global war on terrorism and defeating the most implacable, ruthless enemy our nation has faced in decades.

At the time this article was written, **Kirsten Sanders** was serving as an editorial intern with *Infantry* Magazine from Columbus State University in Columbus, Georgia.

TRAINING AFGHAN SOLDIERS:

A TECHNIQUE FOR BUILDING RAPPORT WITH YOUR COUNTERPARTS

DR. TERRY TUCKER

Counterinsurgency is called graduate level warfare, and for good reason, the dynamics of defeating an insurgent while simultaneously training the host nation security force pose a number of challenges.

Afghanistan, a diverse and varied land with a predominately Persian heritage, historically encompasses the area from the Amu Darya in the North to the Indus in the East, to the deserts of Baluchistan to the Khorasan in modern day Iran; In addition to the seven major languages (Dari, Pashtu, Uzbek, Hazara, Tajik, Turkmen, Baloch, and Aimak), there are at least 400 tribes. With this level of diversity, training an indigenous army and police force is demanding.

In our mobile training team in Afghanistan, we use several techniques to build a connection and rapport with our Afghan counterparts. One of those techniques is the use of Afghan history.

When we begin teaching battle staff, tactical operations center (TOC) operations, troop leading procedures or any of the other courses to Afghan NCOs and officers, we always start with an introduction of ourselves, our military backgrounds, and then we discuss the program of instruction.

For U.S. Soldiers teaching other U.S. Soldiers, this can be relatively easy. We use our rank, past assignments and attendance at the numerous leadership and specialty schools to establish a level of knowledge and competence within our area of expertise. Within the first five or 10 minutes of a presentation, Soldiers would know what kind of instructor you are and may fairly judge your level of competence.

With Afghan soldiers, this technique does not work and has no relevance or meaning for them. They do not understand fully what it means to have earned the rank of an NCO in the U.S. Army. Neither do they associate the level of power, authority, experience and initiative that an American NCO has and is allowed to wield.

Additionally, other traditional western methods don't always work, such as telling a joke, because the joke often does not always translate very well. Nevertheless, during the very first few minutes

Dr. Terry Tucker questions a group of students about their work during a map reading class in Afghanistan.

During a CPX, Afghan police officers refer to a map to conduct battle tracking and reporting.

of our class we know that we still need to rapidly establish a connection in order to earn the Afghan soldiers' respect and attention.

The students, both officers and NCOs, are always a varied age group from young to middle age. One of the training techniques that we use to establish a connection with our Afghan soldier students is the use of Afghan history and how that history relates to training and the Afghan Security Forces.

We have several Afghan historical figures that we use in the introduction. Afghan popular history has a myriad of famous people to pick from. One example is Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni. He was the ruler of the Ghaznavid Empire and extended his rule to include modern day Afghanistan, Pakistan, portions of India and most of Iran. Sultan Mahmud is a celebrated national hero of Afghanistan and is considered a great patron of the arts, architecture and literature. Persian historians such as Abolfazl Beyhaghi and Ferdowsi give shining descriptions of the magnificence of his capital, as well as of the conqueror's support of literature. Sultan Mahmud transformed Ghazni, the first center of Persian literature, into one of the leading cities of Central Asia. The Persian historian and poet Ferdowsi wrote the national epic of the Persian-speaking people, Shahnameh, the Book of Kings, and presented this opus to Sultan Mahmud. To be sure, for the historian there are scholarly differences over some of the details of these two men; however, Afghan popular history paints these figures in a very positive light.

We also use the example of Achmed Shah Durranni; he was a warrior king, poet and administrative genius who rose from the rank of personal servant to king of an empire. The Shah was selected by a council, a Loya Jirga, for both his martial prowess and his statesmenlike qualities. He ultimately extended the empire to include Kashmir, the Sind, the Punjab in the East, the Amu Darya River in the North and Mashdad in modern Iran in the West.

As we progress we sometimes also mention several other key historical people such as: Rabi Balkhi, Shah Rukh, and Uleg Beg. We use these examples, plus many more during the course of our instruction to do several things. First, we use Afghan recognized national and popular history in an attempt to drive a sense of Afghan purpose. We maintain historical accuracy; we briefly relate the major highlights in history in a way to promote a wider sense of Afghan nationalism and pride in the Afghan Army.

For instance,

there are examples of American popular history that immediately convey a sense of American values, mores, perceptions and patriotism. Some literary and Hollywood examples of this popular history that convey a certain American spirit include: *The Birth of a Nation, The Alamo, Battle of the Bulge, Roosevelt's Rough Riders, Fallen Angels, Patton, the Longest Day, Last of the Mohicans, Saving Private Ryan, All Quiet on the Western Front, We were Soldiers Once and Young, Band of Brothers, Glory,* and *Gods and Generals.*

These examples maintain a certain basic level of historical accuracy, but more importantly, they emphasize a certain spirit, values, mores, patriotism, and unity. Likewise, we attempt the same with our Afghan soldier students when we relate the stories of famous Afghan leaders and warriors. Our interpreter has been invaluable in this process.

Secondly, we use these examples, to establish a common link of understanding and to attempt to establish a bond — a bond between people and soldiers — who have a similar bond and history and share adversity, education, arts, and growth with all its values and spirit. Because our Afghan students vary in age, it's easy to forget they also bring a variety of combat experience to the classroom as well. Many of our students are ex-Mujahid. Culturally, they must be able to save face; we explain that we respect that they know how to fight, but we are going to give them skills and soft tools to make them better fighters.

In this process we rely extensively on our interpreter and ensure that we are well-rehearsed and that there are no translation surprises for either of us that would cause

An MTT class poses for a photo with its instructors and translators.

harm and undue cultural insensitivity.

Another technique that is critical to success is to be sure that you speak in short sentences so that the translator can keep pace. Additionally, allow a buffer of extra time to teach a class because of the time required for translation and explaining simple words and concepts that we might normally take for granted.

I have been duly surprised when something I thought would be difficult to grasp was quickly understood, and, likewise when I thought a simple concept could be explained in a few minutes resulted in a 40-minute discussion. If you find them grasping the training session quickly and expect to finish early with your training then go back to the beginning, summarize the key points and conduct one more repetition of the task. Also, have one or two questions that you can use for opportunity training that directly relate to the subject. The Afghan education system, for those fortunate enough to go, also places a heavy emphasis on repetition.

One of the instructors "Tommy" stands behind the corps commander during an MTT in Afghanistan.

There will be amazing revelations in each and every training session. One recent example of this includes a training session in military graphics and symbology. We were using the ANA doctrinal manual on symbology to practice posting enemy symbology on a map. One of the students pointed to one of the graphics and told the translator that the description was an idiom. I was surprised by this and was at first confused. I queried the soldier through our interpreter in an effort to understand what he actually meant. After several minutes of questions we realized that the symbol for an enemy boobytrap actually translates from the English "booby trap" to the Dari of "satan's trap." This is a classic example of some of the cultural and transliteration challenges that occur on a regular basis.

On a more humorous note, one of our students was wasting time and had been slightly recalcitrant in getting back on track to the lesson. After a few minutes he pointed to the other instructor on our team and asked me if the other instructor was "Hazara." I grabbed at the opportunity; this has happened before and "Tommy" was well prepared for this question. I immediately told the student yes and then told that to Tommy. Tommy told the student he was a Hazara and then asked the student through our translator if he knew who his cousin was. Tommy then took the student and translator over to our photo board of previous students and pointed to the Afghan corps commander, who is also Hazara, and said that the corps commander was his cousin. The student almost turned pale and then went immediately back to the map board to finish his work; he was a model of behavior for the remainder of the session.

In closing, the techniques that we learned and practiced at home station do not always assimilate or translate very well in a foreign culture. Like COIN, techniques that worked last week in one province or district do not work the following week in a different province or district. The learning curve for establishing credibility with your Afghan counterpart can be high and set you back in developing a solid relationship unless you are quick to innovate and adapt your training techniques very quickly to the local culture.

Dr. (SGM Retired) Terry Tucker served 23 years on active duty in a variety of instructor, leadership and staff positions in Infantry, Armor, Cavalry, Aviation, and other units. He has a bachelor's in Social Psychology, a master's in Military Studies and a PhD in History. He has served three years as a trainer and advisor to the Royal Saudi Land Forces, one year as a trainer to the Saudi Arabian National Guard, and two years as a trainer in Afghanistan. He is currently a Department of Defense contractor in Afghanistan on a Mobile Training Team that teaches the Afghan Army and Police a variety of classes to include: map reading, military symbology, TOC operations, battle staff operations, troop leading procedures, IPB and several other classes.

Cultural Awareness Resources Available

There are numerous resources on cultural awareness available for Soldiers who would like to do additional research.

The Command and General Staff College's Combined Arms Research Library has a web page listing some of these resources. The site includes the Combined Arms Center Commander's Cultural Awareness Reading List, a compiled list of journal articles and other documents relating to cultural awareness, and lists of Department of Defense and non-DoD Internet sites that may be of interest. The Web site is http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/biblio/cultaware. asp.

Other internet sites that may be of interest are:

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) - http://call.army.mil/

The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center - http://www.dliflc.edu

The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center - http://www.universityofmilitary intelligence.us/tcc

The U.S. Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning - http://www.tecom. usmc.mil/caocl

The Air Force Culture and Language Center - www.au.af.mil/culture

A Soldier's Guide to Understanding Christianity and Islam

CHAPLAIN (MAJOR) WALT HOSKINS

The sights and sounds of Muslim culture can be surprising to the average American Soldier. I'll never forget being awakened by the prayer call early in the morning when I was deployed to Saudi Arabia. Many of the areas where Soldiers deploy are Muslim countries which are heavily influenced by Islam. It is imperative in the day of the "strategic private" for Soldiers to have a basic understanding of Islam.

Five Pillars of Islam

The Islamic faith consists of these five key principles or pillars:

1. Confession (Shahadah). The primary confession of faith for Muslims world wide is "there is no god but Allah, and Mohammed is the messenger of God." This statement identifies people as Muslims. Converts need only repeat it twice in front of another Muslim to be considered a follower of Islam, according to the *Oxford Dictionary of Islam* edited by John L. Esposito.

2. Prayer (Salat). Prayer is central to the Islamic faith. Muslims are supposed to pray five times a day beginning at "day break (salat al-fajr), noon (salat al-duhr), midafternoon (salat al-asr), sunset (salat al-maghreb), and evening (salat al-isha)." It is not uncommon for Soldiers to hear the call to prayer from loudspeakers atop the minarets (mosque towers). Most people are unable to get to the mosque five times a day and hence are permitted to pray at home, at work, or even beside a road, but always facing Mecca. In some cultures, restaurants and businesses close during the prayers; in other cultures there doesn't appear to be an interruption in the daily activity. The Muslim will often pray using his/her prayer rug and will recite the prayers while standing, kneeling and bowing with the forehead touching the ground in submission to God. During a deployment to an Islamic country, it is both common and customary for Soldiers to see Muslims praying.

3. Alms (Zakat). Giving to the needy is a significant duty for Muslims. It is one of their ways of taking care of each other. Muslims are required to give 2.5 percent of their income in Alms directly to the poor and are encouraged to give generously to additional causes if they are able, according to *Inside the Community: Understanding Muslims Through Their Traditions* by Phil Parshall.

4. Fasting (Sawm) during Ramadan. A Department of the Army message is circulated every year preceding Ramadan to inform the command about the practice of fasting Muslim Soldiers. During the month of Ramadan, Muslims are expected to fast during the hours of daylight and are supposed to abstain from sex, food, and drink. There are always exceptions to the rule, but generally everyone who is able fasts for the whole month. Soldiers should be courteous and not eat or drink in front of fasting Muslims during this holy month.

Soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, help secure the street outside of a mosque in Baghdad, Iraq, September 2, 2006.

MC2(SW) Eli J. Medellín, USN

5. Hajj "(Pilgrimage) to Mecca. All adult Muslims are required to make the pilgrimage at least once in their lives if they are physically and financially able. Every year, Saudi Arabia swells with two million Muslim pilgrims who transit the kingdom en route to Mecca. *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam* also states that during this pilgrimage, Muslims do certain acts such as circling the Kaaba seven times, "running back and forth seven times between two small hills near the Kaaba" (symbolizing Abraham's wife-Hagar's search for water), "processing to the plains of Arafat," "scaling the sides of Mount Mercy, where Mohammed delivered his farewell message," stoning Satan (symbolically) seven times and sacrificing animals. Muslims believe that God forgives all previous sins if the Hajj is performed correctly by the worshipper. Soldiers may also witness lesser pilgrimages, particularly in Shiite areas.

In addition to the Five Pillars of Islam, Muslims hold to specific doctrinal teachings. Many religions have creeds or statements of faith which provide a brief explanation of their particular beliefs. Islam also has a statement called the "Six Articles of Faith." A person must affirm their beliefs in the items listed to be a Muslim:

* One God;
* The angels of God;
* The books of God, especially the Qur'an;
* The prophets of God, especially Muhammad;
* The Day of Judgment (or the afterlife); and
* The supremacy of God's will (or predestination).

"This list is sometimes shortened to Five Articles of Faith, which leaves off belief in the supremacy of God's will," according to religionfacts.com.

There are lots of additional nuances of Islam, but the Five Pillars and Six Articles are key points for the Soldier to know about Islam. There are also some key differences and similarities between Christianity and Islam that are worth examining (see Figure 1).

Similarities:
1. Monotheism. Both religions claim to be monotheistic. Muslims claim, however, that Christianity is pagan and corrupted and is not monotheistic since the deity of Jesus Christ is problematic to them. Both share the similarity of having central figures such as God, Jesus or Mohammed.

2. Rituals. As the two largest religions in the world, both share similar worship practices and rituals, such as prayer, prayer beads, fasting, preaching, charity, and evangelizing.

3. Holy books. Islam has three main sources of inspiration and instruction: the Holy Qur'an, the Hadith, and the Sunnah. Christianity also has the Holy Bible (which for some branches is the only source of authority) and official teachings or doctrines of the church.

4. Concern for the poor. Both religions attempt to help poor people through networks of charities and organizations.

5. Variety of expressions, from nominal to fundamental. Our shared humanity is evident in our tendency to be religious. However, in both the west and Islamic cultures one can easily discern that everybody is not a devout Christian or Muslim. America western culture varies from the atheist to the Amish with everything in between. Muslim countries also vary in intensity of religious belief. A 2007 document produced in Jordan, *Jihad and the Muslim Law of War,* lists five categories of Muslims.

a. Secular fundamentalists believe that religion is private and that it should have no role in government or public life. They embrace western culture and reject Islamic culture.

b. Modernist and modern secularists believe that Islam should adjust to the times and embrace western culture.

c. Traditionalists, Islam is the standard for life and faith in a sensible way and maintains flexibility with government structure.

d. Puritanical literalists or Islamists desire to change Muslim culture and government back to what it was like when Mohammed lived.

e. Jihadists have a very narrow view of Islam and regard others besides themselves as apostate. This group is a very small percentage of Muslims world-wide, with "less than one hundredth of one percent of all Muslims or less than one in every 10,000 Muslims" are takfiris, as stated on the Web site ammanmessage.com. This relatively insignificant number of people may seem hard for the average Soldier to believe, considering the amount of contact that Soldiers have with extremists. It appears that this minority Muslim group is attracted to fighting the infidel in Iraq, thereby giving them greater visibility.

6. Idea of world expansion. Both groups are interested in expanding the influence of their religions. Christians try to expand the spiritual kingdom of God by sharing the gospel to all who will hear but do not force conversions or attempt to control governments. Muslims as well have a concept of world expansion that appears to have a territorial (Taliban, Al-Qaeda) element to it.

7. Historic figures. Both religions share a common key figure, Abraham, and are considered "Abraham religions." Moses, Jesus, and Ishmael are additional common figures. Islam and Christianity share some common stories as well but with character changes. In Christianity, it is believed that Abraham took his son *Isaac* up to the mountain to be sacrificed and was spared when God provided a ram. Islam tells the story that Abraham took his son *Ishmael* up to the mountain to be sacrificed and was spared by the ram. Christianity teaches that Jesus was crucified; Islam says someone else was crucified in Jesus' place.

8. Holy sites. Both religions have their own locations that they consider to be holy: Jerusalem, Medina, Mecca, the Vatican, Bethlehem, the Mosque etc. Shiia Islam has additional holy sites that we often hear about in the news, such as Karbala (where Ali and his companions were murdered in 681). Soldiers should always be aware of which sites or structures are considered "holy" in their area.

9. The two greatest commandments. Both religions share the idea of "love of God and love of neighbor." *A Common Word between Us and You* is a movement among moderate Muslims to call both Christians and Muslims to agree on these two commands that both groups have in common. This Muslim movement was in response to Pope Benedict XVI's Regensburg address of September 13, 2006. Time alone will tell if this effort will have an affect on the world in general and on our Soldiers who are on the front line battling Islamic Jihadists. Soldiers should guard against the idea that every Muslim is a terrorist. In fact, Soldiers will encounter more moderate Muslims than terrorists and should seek common ground through these two important commandments.

Differences:
1. Jesus Christ.
In Islam, Jesus Christ was the Messiah born of the Virgin Mary and was a prophet

Figure 1 — Religion Facts Chart Comparing Christianity and Islam

HISTORY & STATS	CHRISTIANITY	ISLAM
Date founded	c. 30 AD	622 CE
Place founded	Palestine	Saudi Arabia
Founders & early leaders	Jesus, Peter, Paul	Muhammad
Original languages	Aramaic and Greek	Arabic
Major location today	Europe, North and South America	Middle East, Southeast Asia
Adherents worldwide today	2 billion	1.3 billion
Current size rank	Largest in the world	Second largest in the world
Major branches	Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant	Sunni, Shiite
RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY	**CHRISTIANITY**	**ISLAM**
Sacred text	Bible = Old Testament (Jewish Bible) + New Testament	Qur'an (Koran)
Inspiration of sacred text	Views vary: literal Word of God, inspired human accounts, or of human origin only	Literal Word of God
Status of biblical prophets	True prophets	True prophets
Status of Jewish Bible	Canonical	Noncanonical but useful as a (corrupted) inspired text
Status of Jewish Apocrypha	Canonical (Catholic); useful but noncanonical (Protestant)	Noncanonical
Status of New Testament	Canonical	Noncanonical but useful as a (corrupted) inspired text
Summaries of doctrine	Apostle's Creed, Nicene Creed	Six Articles of Faith
Religious law	Canon law (Catholics)	Sharia
Other written authority	Church fathers, church councils, ecumenical creeds (all branches); papal decrees, canon law (Catholics)	Hadith
RITUALS & PRACTICES	**CHRISTIANITY**	**ISLAM**
House of worship	Church, chapel, cathedral, basilica, meeting hall	Mosque
Day of worship	Sunday	Friday
Religious leaders	Pope, priest, bishop, archbishop, patriarch, pastor, minister, preacher, deacon	Imams
Major sacred rituals	Baptism, communion (Eucharist)	Five Pillars: prayer, pilgrimage, charity, fasting, confession of faith
Head covered during prayer?	Generally no	Yes
Central religious holy days	Lent, Holy Week, Easter	Eid-al-Fitr, Eid-al-Adha, month of Ramadan
Other holidays	Christmas, saints days	Mawlid, Ashura
Major symbols	Cross, crucifix, dove, anchor, fish, alpha and omega, chi rho, halo	Crescent, name of Allah in Arabic

www.religionfacts.com/islam/beliefs/six_articles.htm

BELIEFS & DOCTRINE	CHRISTIANITY	ISLAM
Ultimate reality	One creator God	One creator God
Nature of God	Trinity - one substance, three persons	Unity - one substance, one person
Other spiritual beings	Angels and demons	Angels, demons, jinn
Revered humans	Saints, church fathers	Prophets, imams (especially in Shia Islam)
Identity of Jesus	Son of God, God incarnate, savior of the world	True prophet of God, whose message has been corrupted
Birth of Jesus	Virgin birth	Virgin birth
Death of Jesus	Death by crucifixion	Did not die, but ascended bodily into heaven (a disciple died in his place)
Resurrection of Jesus	Affirmed	Denied, since he did not die
Second coming of Jesus	Affirmed	Affirmed
Mode of divine revelation	Through Prophets and Jesus (as God Himself), recorded in Bible	Through Muhammad, recorded in Qur'an
Human nature	"Original sin" inherited from Adam - tendency towards evil	Equal ability to do good or evil
Means of salvation	Correct belief, faith, good deeds, sacraments (some Protestants emphasize faith alone)	Correct belief, good deeds, Five Pillars
God's role in salvation	Predestination, various forms of grace	Predestination
Good afterlife	Eternal heaven	Eternal paradise
Bad afterlife	Eternal hell, temporary purgatory (Catholicism)	Eternal hell
View of the other religion	Islam is respected as a fellow monotheistic religion, but Muhammad is not seen as a true prophet	Christians are respected as "People of the Book," but they have mistaken beliefs and only partial revelation

Continuation of Figure 1

who preached the truth. He was NOT crucified for the sins of mankind but will return again in the future.

In Christianity, Jesus Christ was the Son of God, born of the Virgin Mary; Second Person of the Holy Trinity; a Prophet; Priest; and King who is the Truth, who died on the cross for the sins of mankind, rose again on the third day, and will return again in the future.

This difference in understanding of the nature of Jesus Christ is very important. In Christianity, Jesus is the Son of God and equal with God. In Islam, Jesus is a lesser messenger than Mohammed.

On the surface, this may appear to be only a slight difference since both religions recognize the significant role of Jesus Christ. However, this is a monumental theological difference that has been an impasse for 1300 years.

2. Mohammed.

In Islam, Mohammed is the last prophet who was given the Qur'an through the Angel Gabriel. Mohammed preached the truth (correcting Judaism and Christianity which became corrupted over time) and is the example in faith and life for all Muslims, according to the *Oxford Dictionary of Islam*.

In Christianity, Mohammed is the founder of Islam, a separate religion and not the corrected version of Judaism or Christianity; he serves no role in the lives of Christians.

One Muslim man I talked with took great offense at the resistance of people in the west to give their children Muslim names. He said that Muslims give their children biblical names such as Moses, Jesus, and Abraham, but Christians never named their sons Mohammed. He saw this as a form of prejudice against Muslims when, in reality, it reflects the fact that Mohammed does not have a place in Christianity.

3. Worship.

While both religions consider themselves to be monotheistic, and have common practices, the worship experiences of the two are very different. At the mosque worshippers wear no shoes, sometimes wash themselves and their feet prior to entering, stand in rows and bow down on the floor during their prayers. Women may be present in the back or in the balcony but not among the male worshippers (for the purpose of modesty). There are no musical instruments or chairs, and worshippers gather by a call to prayer from the tower (minaret). Friday is the main day for worship, and in my travels and deployments, everything came to a halt to accommodate religious services on Fridays.

Many Soldiers are familiar with the various expressions of Christian worship services which are usually accompanied by musical instruments and attended by men and women seated together. Worshippers keep their shoes on their feet and usually do not go through a cleansing process before entering the church. Often times

worshippers gather to the sound of bells ringing from the bell tower (however, this is a dated practice).

4. Cultural assimilation of the religion.

This is a big difference between western culture and Muslim culture. Most, if not all, of the west is in a post-Christian era. While a large number of Americans claim to be Christian, it doesn't appear to affect the daily lives or patterns of people. There is a tendency in western culture for people to compartmentalize their lives. We have a work persona, a church persona, an internet identity, a married identity, and an off-duty persona, and we like to keep the compartments separate. There does not appear to be such a drastic degree of compartmentalization in the life of a Muslim. Islam affects all areas of life for the Muslim including dress, speech, work, diet, fate, etc.

5. Religion and Government.

Most westerners grew up in an era of "separation of church and state." We have watched the political and legal processes which dealt with issues such as the terms "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance and "In God We Trust" on our money. The Infantryman who serves in the Islamic world quickly finds himself in a society that is deeply affected by religion and where the civilian population is often more loyal to the sheiks, clerics, imams, and mullahs than to elected officials or the rule of law.

It seems that much of the domestic issues in Iraq seem to center on the tensions between the Sunnis and the Shiites. The news stories about a possible civil war in Iraq focus on the Mehdi Army, the Shiite Militia under the leadership of Muqtada al-Sadr, and the Shiite struggle for power in the Sunni-dominated government have had a lot of press. However, this is not a recent development. The tension between Sunnis and Shiites goes back about 1,300 years.

The Prophet Mohammed established Islam and was the sole source of power and authority regarding the religion. Mohammed did not leave clear instructions about who would assume leadership of the religion when he died. Consequently, there has been a struggle between the two groups of Muslims who both claim to be the legitimate leaders of Islam.

The Shiites believe in a family based succession of leadership from Mohammed beginning with his son-in-law, Ali, who was the fourth successor (caliph) back in 632. World-wide Shiites are the minority sect of Islam, accounting for only 10-15 percent of all Muslims, and who live primarily in Iran. The Shiites have some religious practices that differ from the Sunnis that Soldiers may encounter in Iraq, such as additional pilgrimages to Shiite holy shrines that have been the center of violence between the two groups.

The Sunnis, on the other hand, believed that heirs of the first four caliphs, not merely Ali, were legitimate religious/political leaders (caliph). Today the primary concern for the Sunnis is not lineage but "worthiness of religious leadership." The struggle over legitimate authority and power is at the root of the internal conflict in Iraq. While Sunnis represent about 85 percent of Muslims worldwide- they are not the majority sect in Iraq. The Iraqi population is approximately 65 percent Shiite and 35 percent Sunni. Saddam Hussein and the Baathist party were mostly Sunni, and many of their victims, including the attacks against villages in southern Iraq after Gulf War 1, were Shiites. Given the religious history of the Sunnis and Shiites, it seems that much of the aggression between the two groups is more political than religious.

Many political struggles are disguised as religious turmoil when in reality the religion is being used by factions to create division, i.e. Catholic vs. Protestant issues in Northern Ireland. Al-Qaeda and other insurgents will attempt to manipulate tribal, religious, and cultural differences to weaken Iraq and attempt to establish an Islamist state like they had in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

Religious expression, practices, dress and customs of Islam can be very confusing to the average Soldier. However, Soldiers must overcome culture shock and realize that people everywhere take their religion seriously and are personally affronted when they feel disrespected or mocked. Even non-religious Americans get up in arms about taking "in God we trust" off our currency or taking the phrase "Under God" out of the "Pledge of Allegiance" because it is an insult to our way of life. Winning the hearts and minds of the people means applying the Army Value of Respect when it comes to understanding indigenous religions.

Chaplain (MAJ) Walt Hoskins is currently serving as the ethics instructor with Combined Arms and Tactics Directorate, U.S. Army Infantry Center and School at Fort Benning, Georgia. He is also senior pastor of CrossRoads Contemporary Service at the post's Follow Me Chapel. His previous assignments include serving as the regimental chaplain for the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas; brigade chaplain for the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade and task force chaplain for 5-7 ADA Battalion. A list of references for this article is on file and available through *Infantry* Magazine.

SSG Sean A. Foley

An Iraqi policeman with the 5th Brigade, 2nd Division, Iraqi National Police pulls security at a mosque during a patrol in the Karkh District in Baghdad March 27, 2007.

Training Notes

'Team Fish Hook' Long Range Carbine Marksmanship Training in Afghanistan

CAPTAIN MATTHEW D. MCDONALD

This article describes what we called "Fish Hook" (from our call sign) long range carbine marksmanship training we executed in December 2007 at Spin Buldak, Afghanistan. We wrapped up a very successful austere-environment shooting training event after several months of planning, collecting information, and fabricating targets.

I was the senior infantry advisor for an 18-man Afghan Border Police mentor team. My team was made up of senior NCOs (sergeants first class and one master sergeant) and officers (captains and a major). We mentored an Afghan Border Police unit tasked with securing a sector responsible for 500 kilometers of border (no, that's not a typo).

We lived in an old Special Forces firebase on the border with Pakistan from January 2007 through January 2008. Spin Buldak is Afghanistan's second largest border crossing point. The (believe me) not-so-friendly "Friendship Gate" takes in a very large portion of the country's revenues through import taxes.

It seemed that with "The Big Dance" being in Iraq — those of us in Afghanistan were left to play second fiddle for resources and manpower. What we did was a result of each Soldier's time and effort, especially the work of the highly professional NCOs that I had the privilege of working with on the project: SFC John Giles, SFC Lee Picket, SFC Brian Lamberton, and SFC Steve Steiger. I would have loved to have conducted the range earlier in our tour but training ammo was in short supply for most of our deployment.

We received help from several sources. Mark Mann is a "marksmanship guru" with the Kentucky State Rifle and Pistol Association and an adjunct instructor for the Civilian Marksmanship Program's Squad Designated Marksman Military Rifle Instructor staff. He squared me away with the right data and a superb course format. LTC Dave Liwanag, a former U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit (USAMU) commander, wrote an *Infantry* Magazine article with info on constructing a known distance range while deployed which was a great help. MAJ Dave Cloft of the U.S. Army Reserve Rifle Team sent us ballistic cards and other ballistic data. Fort Campbell Range Safety was extremely helpful in ensuring that we executed this training event safely and we were set up using proper safety danger zones and safety precautions. The Army Marksmanship Unit Designated Marksman Course curriculum is posted on AKO and allowed us to prepare excellent classroom instruction.

Training started with two hours of classroom instruction in which the NCOs gave their respective classes. To say the least, many of my peers had the thousand-meter stare at first as we delved into formulas on minutes-of-angle,

Captain Dan Celucci fires his M4 while a spotter watches impacts.

Photos courtesy of author

Above, SFC John Giles fills sandbags for firing positions. At right, SFC Steve Steiger cuts steel plate to make F and E-type silhouette targets in preparation for long range carbine marksmanship training.

zeroing, wind shift, and wind speed.

Our final range layout was a group of three targets at each given range. The 100-meter targets were MK19 ammo cans, painted red; the 200-meter targets were steel F-type silhouettes, and the 300, 400, and 500-meter targets were full-size steel E-type silhouettes.

Day 1 ended with a 200-meter field zero session in which, of the 15 Soldiers involved, only three had ever conducted and confirmed a field zero on their service rifle before.

Day 2 started with shooting from the standing position at the 100-meter line. Our target was MK19 ammo cans painted red and each shooter was paired with a spotter. The spotter and shooter took turns firing four separate 10-shot groups.

Shooter pairs continued to the 20-meter line and shot in the kneeling position. Next were the 300 and 400-meter lines shooting in the prone unsupported position, and we finished at the 500-meter line firing from prone supported.

We conducted range estimation and hold-off training next. The coaches were told the time engagement standards and gave their shooters five rounds to engage three targets at varying ranges. The shooter had to quickly estimate range, adjust his sights accordingly, assume shooting position, estimate wind speed, and transition from target to target within the given time standards. An average iteration involved a shooter engaging a 600-meter target, 500-meter target, and 150-meter target in 56 seconds.

The culmination event was a shooting competition. We gave each shooter 10 rounds at each station with a time standard for each range. The firing positions and time standards were:

- 100 meters, standing (4 seconds x 10 for 40 seconds);
- 200 meters, kneeling (5 seconds x 10 for 50 seconds);
- 300 and 400 meters, prone unsupported (6 and 9 seconds, respectively, x 10 for 60 seconds and 90 seconds, respectively); and
- 500 meters, prone supported (10 seconds x 10 for 100 seconds).

After two hours of classroom instruction and 350 rounds per shooter, our high score was 33 of 50. This may not seem like much, but we spotted "hits" and "misses" with optics. Spotting 5.56mm target impacts at 400 and 500 meters can be difficult in sandy terrain so our scores may have been a few rounds short, but it was a great competition nonetheless. We had a lot more participation than expected and the course was a huge success.

As you can see by some of the photographs, Afghanistan's terrain offers many more opportunities for long range engagements — this was a long overdue and much-needed training event. When we conducted our handover with our relief force, we gave the firebase a range and the capability to conduct long-range training any day of the week with minimal assets. The course was so successful that we taught the techniques to a Canadian reconnaissance company the next week.

On behalf of my team I would like to thank those who supported us for their patience and perseverance while we put this all together. They gave us what every Soldier wants and that is confidence that he can do what is asked of him and be the very best at it. To quote Mark Mann, "There is no substitute for good marksmanship."

CPT Matthew D. McDonald is currently attending the Maneuver Captains' Career Course at Fort Benning, Georgia. CPT McDonald is a 2006 graduate of Austin Peay State University in Clarksville, Tennessee. He was commissioned from the Officer Candidate School in April 2003. As an enlisted Soldier, he was a forward observer, MOS 13F. After commissioning he served as a platoon leader in B Company, 2nd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, "Rakkasans," 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). CPT McDonald served as the Senior Infantry Mentor to the 4th Brigade, Afghan Border Police at Spin Buldak, Afghanistan from January to December 2007.

Apache gunships provide air support while U.S. Army paratroopers assault an objective during the Joint Readiness Training Exercise at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, May 29. The Soldiers are assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division's 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment.

USAIS WRITING CONTEST ENDS DECEMBER 31

The U.S. Army Infantry School (USAIS) Professional Writing Contest is open to anyone, civilian or of any military rank, including Maneuver Captains' Career Course (MCCC) and Maneuver Advanced NCO Course (M-ANCOC) and other commissioned and noncommissioned USAIS students wanting to share their experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, or on other deployments with Soldiers serving in the global war on terrorism.

Each entrant should submit an unclassified, original paper on any subject relevant to current operations. Papers should be between 2,000 and 4,000 words. Submit slides and line art as Microsoft Office PowerPoint files, with photographs submitted as jpg or tif files. Each entry must include a completed submission form (Available on our Web site). The article should be a double-spaced Word document in 12 point Times New Roman font.

Entries and submission forms due to Editor, *Infantry* Magazine, by December 31, 2008.

Mail to: *Infantry* Magazine, ATTN: Editor, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005.

In addition to a hard copy of the article and submission form, please include a disk or CD with the files a well.

Winners will be announced in the May-June 2009 issue.

For more information about the contest, contact the magazine staff through one of the following methods:

E-mail — russell.eno@us.army.mil.

Telephone — (706) 545-2350/6951 or DSN 835-2350/6951

Web site — https://www.infantry.army.mil/magazine (will need to enter AKO login and password)

MTPs To Be Phased Out

COMBINED ARMS AND TACTICS DIRECTORATE, U.S. ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL

The Department of the Army (DA) and Combined Arms Center (CAC) have directed branch proponent schools to no longer develop and publish Mission Training Plans (MTPs) and to place collective tasks and other training products on the Digital Training Management System (DTMS). Infantry proponent MTPs will be removed from the Reimer Digital Library in June 2008. However, the Infantry unit task lists and collective tasks will be posted to the Warrior University Web site (https://www.warrioruniversity.army.mil/login.html) and a link to that site will be posted on the U.S. Army Infantry Center home page (https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry).

This site will provide access to the latest, approved Infantry collective tasks that are now also accessible through the web-based Digital Training Management System (DTMS). The DTMS has replaced the old Standard Army Training System and is the only authorized automated system for managing training in Army units, e.g., for developing the unit's mission essential task list (METL), for assessing METL, for developing unit training plans/schedules, for accessing Combined Arms Training Strategies, etc. Additionally, DTMS allows units to track Soldiers' training and readiness, to do roll-up reports on training accomplishment, and to pass Soldiers' training information to gaining units when they receive the Soldiers (Army Physical Fitness Test, profile, height/weight history, licenses, weapons qualification, common task testing, etc.).

The Infantry unit task lists and tasks will remain and be updated on the Warrior University site until DTMS becomes more widely accepted and used in unit training management across the Army. Placing the tasks on a database such a DTMS (which is updated monthly) or the Warrior University site will allow them to be more easily updated and made accessible to the field in a timely manner.

Infantry battle drill books which contain the approved Infantry battle drills will remain on the Reimer Digital Library until revision and updating of drills is completed in the 4th Quarter 08. At that time, the revised drills will be placed on the DTMS and the Warrior University Web site along with the collective tasks and the current Infantry Battle Drill Books will be removed from the Reimer.

For more information, contact Ralph Hammond at ralph.hammond@conus.army.mil or (706) 545-1256/DSN 835-1256.

SCENARIO HIGHLIGHTS EFFECTIVE PERSONNEL RECOVERY PROGRAM

WAYNE HEARD

Author's Note: *The incidents described in this article are somewhat artificial and the time elements were compressed in order to provide the reader a picture of the Personnel Recovery (PR) system.*

The scenario

It was a routine day working in Iraq, until you heard, "Attention on the floor. There's been a PR incident." As the watch officer for your staff section, you join the small group assembling around the Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell (PRCC) director.

"A combat logistics patrol (convoy) was ambushed at 0810 this morning. The ambush was initiated with an IED. The convoy fought through the ambush, and the commander circled the wagons down the road and determined that they were missing one vehicle and the four Soldiers riding in that vehicle. He immediately reported this information to his chain of command and to us."

He continued, "The village, where the incident occurred is fairly small. The convoy commander recommended, and was approved to, return to the ambush site, establish **hasty checkpoints** around the village and begin searching for the missing Soldiers — a **cordon and search**."

While the convoy personnel begin the **immediate recovery** operations, their brigade combat team headquarters begins lining up additional units to support this recovery operation. The PR officer (PRO) at brigade immediately notified the PR staff at Multi-National Division (MND) headquarters, and they, in turn, passed it to the Multi-National Corps (MNC) PR staff who alerted the entire PR architecture in theater.

The BCT's quick reaction force (QRF) was already engaged in an operation in their sector so it was unavailable to assist in this recovery. The BCT asked for assistance from the MND.

The MND PR staff determined that the ambush site was close to a boundary line and that the neighboring BCT had a unit close by. MND alerted this BCT and the closest company began to load up their Strykers to assist the convoy commander, who was now well into the cordon and search. The Stryker company had rehearsed various recovery operations routinely since their arrival in theater.

As the company began moving toward the village, the PRO began coordinating with the PR staff at division to bring in additional troops to assist with the cordon and search and for an air contingent to watch for all vehicles and personnel leaving the village.

At the joint operations center (JOC), you are learning that a missing Soldier drill is quite a bit like an Amber Alert used to search for kidnapped children, back in the States. Even though all the scheduled missions and those underway continue, a significant effort is devoted to recovering the Soldiers.

The PRCC staff then begins to review the PR battle drill. They keep referring to the military decision making process (MDMP) matrix in FM 3-50.1, *Army Personnel Recovery*, and you make a note to download it so that you can ensure your staff completes all its requirements.

"Personnel: Let's find out who the missing Soldiers are and let's make sure everyone who was supposed to be with that convoy was actually with it." The "4" reported that the convoy had already made two stops during that run. "Let's make sure that the vehicle and all four Soldiers actually departed with the convoy when it left that last forward operating base (FOB) before the ambush."

The intelligence NCO said that a request for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support and archived photos of the area were already submitted. The photos will prove handy for the today's search and to look for changes in the area if

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Personnel Recovery

"The sum of military, diplomatic and civil efforts to effect the recovery and return of U.S. military, DoD civilians, and DoD contractor personnel or other personnel as determined by the Secretary of Defense, who are isolated or missing in an operational environment. Also called **PR**."

— Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3270.01A

Personnel Recovery Tasks
- ☐ Report
- ☐ Locate
- ☐ Support
- ☐ Recover
- ☐ Reintegrate

There are three **options** that the United States may employ when recovering isolated personnel:
- ■ Military
- ■ Diplomatic
- ■ Civil

The **Military option** has several **categories of recovery**, with one being the **Component**.

The **Component category** includes the methods in which the individual services conduct recovery operations.

The Army uses four **methods** of recovery:
- ☐ Unassisted
- ☐ Immediate
- ☐ Deliberate
- ☐ External Supported

References
- ■ FM 3-50.1, *Personnel Recovery*
- ■ HQDA PR website - https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/373835
- ■ Army PR Office - (703) 692-3115/3116/3117

the search becomes extended. You reflect upon the Soldiers who are currently listed on the daily DUSTWUN (duty status whereabouts unknown) and the continuing efforts to locate them.

Meanwhile, the J-4 has begun to assemble another convoy to get the needed classes of supply to that next FOB. The "1" and the "4" are working together, along with the convoy commander, to determine who the missing Soldiers are. The PR cell director has coordinated for air support, psychological operations support, and intelligence support.

Back at the village, the convoy commander has secured the damaged vehicle and the sensitive items. Boot prints leading away from the vehicle, along with spent shell casings, make it look as if at least two Soldiers fought their way out of the kill zone. There were also signs that another two had been dragged away.

The convoy commander is in contact with close air support, the Army Air QRF, and the approaching Stryker company. He is coordinating the cordon and search of this village that is growing increasingly robust. The convoy Soldiers are systematically searching each and every building in the village.

The convoy personnel sealed the immediate area around the ambush site. The Stryker company then arrives and creates an outer ring to the cordon. The convoy commander briefs the Stryker company commander on the status of the search and the missing Soldiers.

The two leaders agreed that after a quick "right seat ride," the Stryker company commander will assume control of the operation freeing the convoy personnel to complete their original mission. The Stryker company commander will be the on-site commander.

As the search continued, the PRCC and JPRC continued to develop support. They also discussed the possible employment of Special Operations forces to conduct the recovery. The distance to this village and an ongoing operation might preclude their use. Intelligence personnel along with Civil Affairs; PSYOP, and transition teams that had worked the area began to build a picture of the villages. More importantly, they were learning who were hostile and who might be friendly.

The "1" and the "4" have identified the missing Soldiers and verified that they were in the convoy when it departed from the last FOB. The "1" also had all units and contracting companies account for 100 percent of their personnel. It was important to ensure that no one was "catching a ride" with the convoy, unknown to the convoy commander. The PR Intel NCO informs the assembled team that she has submitted the request for fingerprints of the four Soldiers from the FBI.

You remember preparing for your first deployment and how everyone had to be fingerprinted as part of the isolated personnel report (ISOPREP) process. When you began processing for deployment this time, you completed the process from your home computer and no fingerprints were required. The data was transferred from your computer to a secure Web site automatically. Now, the ISOPREP data for every deployed Soldier, DA civilian and contractor is in the secure, national database. You never have to complete another ISOPREP again. The next time you deploy, you'll only need to review the information to ensure it is current. It really simplifies the job of managing ISOPREPs. Instead of searching through 150,000 files and folders, the staff can access the data by typing in a Soldier's name.

You are amazed by all the "players" who have become involved in this operation. The public affairs officer had already developed a plan for providing information to the media about the event. The chaplain had planned for support upon the Soldiers' return. The PR cell accesses the ISOPREP data from the national database and passes the Soldiers' descriptions and authentication data to the Stryker company commander who relays it to his company leaders.

The intel NCO coordinated for manned and unmanned aircraft flying overhead to look for Ground to Air Signal (GTAS) and other signs of the Soldiers' presence. Communications personnel, along with SIGINT personnel, had been alerted to listen for radio transmissions on the "sheriff's net," command net, convoy net, survival radio net, etc. Intelligence personnel also listened for enemy transmissions that might give us a clue to the Soldiers' locations or enemy activities regarding these missing Soldiers.

Every piece of available information is being entered into a PR mission management log. You discovered that this record is vital for several reasons: if the search becomes extended, the recovery staffs routinely go back to the original logs to check new information; if the search is unsuccessful those personnel who take on the personnel accounting role will need the best available data to continue the investigation; and when the search and recovery is successful, the documents must accompany the returnee through the Reintegration Phases. The records are then packaged and submitted to the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA).

A convoy from the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment arrives at a city in the Kirkuk province of Iraq March 21, 2007.

TSGT Maria J. Bare, USAF

	Begins	Location/ Responsibility	Activities
Phase I	IMDC comes under U.S. control	Theater / COCOM Responsibility	• Medical exam/treatment • SERE debrief (lessons) • Intel debrief (information) •Transport to Phase II (if req'd)
Phase II	Arrives from Phase I	Theater / COCOM Responsibility	•Medical exam/treatment •SERE debrief (lessons) •Intel debrief (information) •Transport to Phase III (if req'd)
Phase III	Arrives from Phase II	CONUS / Service (Army) Responsibility	•Medical treatment continues •SERE debriefings continue •Intel debriefings continue •Phase III continues based on IMDC situation

Figure 1 — Reintegration

A Civil Affairs LNO identifies a villager who has been helpful in the past. The HUMINT team concurs with the assessment of this villager. The name is transmitted to the Stryker company commander. Several "terps" (interpreters) have been airlifted to the village to assist in the search. The commander assigns his senior platoon leader to accompany a "terp" to the Civil Affair's asset. The villager suggests a possible location where the Soldiers might have been taken. The platoon leader leaves a squad to keep "eyes on target" as he returns to the commander to make his report.

The squad reports that two men have departed the building. As they approached a checkpoint, they are stopped, apprehended, separated and questioned. One admits that two Soldiers are being held in the building and adds that the hostage takers are growing anxious about being caught with them. The hostage takers had expected to drive away with them to a much larger town, but the checkpoints were established too quickly for them to get away.

After considering the new information, the company commander decides that the recovery needs to be conducted immediately. He begins planning for a raid of the building. Based on the size of the building, he decides on one platoon as the assault force; one positioned as perimeter security; and a squad from another platoon for support.

The 1SG recommends that the other two squads maintain a watch on the buildings and roads that have already been cleared — just in case this turns out to be a dry hole. He also reminds the company commander that after securing the two Soldiers, the troops need to protect the site and treat it as a crime scene so that the CID and others can conduct their forensic investigation.

The company commander relays his plan to higher for approval. The launch and execute authorities for a personnel recovery mission have to be requested from higher headquarters. While headquarters reviews his plan, the company commander and 1SG supervise the rehearsals.

The PR staff recommends approval of the recovery operation. The MNC commander approves the company commander's plan with minor modifications. They are given launch and execute authority.

The raid is executed vigorously and the two Soldiers are recovered. The assault platoon also recovers two weapons and two sets of gear. They seal the site to protect the crime scene. There is no visible evidence of the other two Soldiers having been held here. But where are they?

The successful raid creates a high level of excitement among everyone involved, but it is an excitement tempered with the knowledge that there are still two Soldiers out there who are IMDC. The company commander reports the results to the PRO and the report is passed to the PRCC.

By now, the entire PR architecture is energized. The U.S. Air Force sent a survival, evasion, resistance and escape (SERE) specialist and combat rescue officer (CRO) to the PRCC to assist in reviewing the EPA (or PR contingency plan). They are using the two and three-dimensional images of the terrain to determine the possible evasion routes that an untrained evader might follow, if under enemy pressure.

The PR team is reviewing the ISOPREP data to determine the levels of SERE training each Soldier has completed. The unit 1SG and company commander have been contacted for insights into their training and mental toughness. Do their duties put them into contact with information that is sensitive? What types of SERE equipment will they generally carry with them? What are their backgrounds and what do we know about them that can aid in their recovery? Is either one trained in advanced medical skills (combat lifesaver)?

As the mission extends into the night, various air platforms are incorporated into the search. The staff conducts a full blown mission analysis with a formal METT-TC look at the situation. The SERE personnel advise that the proximity of a canal increases the complexity of the planning and the search.

The planning team determines that there are two or three probable situations. One is that these two Soldiers are evading, an **unassisted recovery**. Another possibility is that these two Soldiers were taken by a second group of hostage takers. A third possibility is that one Soldier has been taken hostage and the other is evading. Regardless, the search must continue within the village and the surrounding area.

As the evening progresses, an infantry battalion from the BCT is moved into the area and performs a relief in place with the Stryker company, allowing them to get some much needed rest. The battalion commander assumes the role of on-site mission commander. Throughout the night, aircraft fly overhead playing music that is reported to be significant to the missing Soldiers. This is designed to boost their morale and let them know that their buddies are continuing the search. Doctrinally, this is one of the five Personnel Recovery tasks — support.

Every aircraft crew has been alerted to be on the lookout for emergency signals from the area.

When the mission became more

involved, the PR cell director requested **external support** from intelligence assets, Air Force SERE personnel, and even close air support (CAS), just in case.

You've seen the members of the PR cell begin tracking the recovery and you've witnessed the event evolve into a full court press by almost every desk in the JOC. The PR Cell director involved personnel from every staff and every service and even used personnel in engineer boats to work this recovery.

From a doctrinal perspective the evading Soldiers are involved in an **unassisted recovery**. The mission evolved from an **immediate recovery** operation conducted as a **hasty check point** and **cordon and search** to a **deliberate recovery** conducted as a **raid**. Because other services are involved in this recovery, doctrinally it is considered an **external supported recovery.**

As daylight approaches, the recovery forces (air, ground and maritime) are really cranking it up to high gear. The SERE specialist suggests searching a wooded area close to the canal. It's a large area and aircraft have over flown it twice already without seeing any signals. But it's going to require a ground force search to really give it a good look.

The now-rested Stryker company is given the mission to conduct the ground search. The Stryker company commander develops a plan for searching the area. The company moves to the wooded area on Strykers, but conducts a **movement to contact**, on foot, to **link up** with the IMDC (isolated, missing, detained or captured) Soldiers. The men are warned that they need to be on the lookout for a recovery activation signal (RAS) that will alert them that the IMDC Soldiers are nearby. They also need to be alert to the danger of insurgents. This mission will require strict discipline, mature response, and tight control to avoid a friendly fire incident.

The PR cell is now monitoring several ongoing operations: the debriefing of the original convoy leadership; the battalion cordon and search operation of the village; the canal search by Engineer boat crews; the aviation search and outer perimeter cordon; the coordination for military working dogs to track the IMDC Soldiers; intelligence platforms searching the area; and the intelligence and SERE debriefing of the recovered Soldiers, along with their medical treatment plan. These Soldiers have begun undergoing their reintegration actions.

The PR director has even coordinated with the Ministry of the Interior to lower the water levels in the canal to aid in the search and for USN divers to conduct an underwater search if the Soldiers aren't found by the end of the day.

Meanwhile, back in the States, the regional casualty assistance teams have notified the primary next of kin of both Soldiers of their status and the details surrounding the incident. The casualty assistance teams inform the next of kin of the support activities that are available to them.

Back on the "floor" the intelligence NCO comes out of the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) with a new report. A GTAS has been spotted in a clearing in the wooded area near the canal. The location is transmitted to the company commander. He reviews the recovery protocols, from the Air Tasking Order Special Instructions (ATO SPINS) with his platoon leaders; they enter the GTAS data into their GPS, adjust their azimuths and move out to make the link up.

Within an hour, the lead element of the company spots the Recovery Activation Signal (RAS). The unit moves forward cautiously. The lead fire team leader displays the far recognition signal. A Soldier steps out from behind a tree and responds correctly. The unit moves closer and establishes an overwatch position. The lead fire team moves forward and challenges the Soldier with the near recognition signal. The response is correct and both Soldiers come out of hiding. The link up is complete.

After 24 hours, the Soldiers have been recovered. Their **unassisted recovery** evolved from an **immediate recovery** attempt, to a **deliberate recovery operation** and ultimately an **externally supported recovery**.

The Stryker company establishes a pick-up zone and the Soldiers are extracted to the Phase I reintegration site for a medical checkup, SERE debrief and an intelligence debriefing.

The operation's success was dependent on employing the Personnel Recovery fundamentals. The Soldiers, who had become isolated, were prepared to survive and evade. The commanders and staffs understood the PR system and had conducted staff rehearsals and exercises for recovery missions. The PR staff ensured that every unit understood the recovery protocols. The forces involved in conducting the recovery operations had routinely rehearsed their actions.

As you returned to your desk on the floor, you think back to your training at Fort Benning and your time as a platoon leader and you understand how the Army's Personnel Recovery program really puts teeth into the Warrior Ethos:

I will always place the mission first.

I will never accept defeat.

I will never quit.

I will never leave a fallen comrade.

For additional information on the Army Personnel Recovery program,

* Contact your BCT PRO;

* Consult FM 3-50.1, Army Personnel Recovery;

* Review the Personnel Recovery Program Chain Teaching Program.

* Access the HQDA PR Web site — https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/373835; or

* Contact the Army PR office at (703) 692-3115/3116/3117/3045/3143 (DSN 222).

Wayne Heard began his career with the Army in 1972, serving in the 82nd Airborne Division. He was the Distinguished Leadership Graduate from his Officer Candidate School class and graduated from the Infantry Officers Basic and Advanced Courses, Ranger School, and the Special Forces Officers Course. In addition to the 82nd, he served with 25th Infantry Division, 5th Special Forces Group, Cadet Command and 10th Special Forces Group. He began his association with Personnel Recovery as the S-3 and XO of 1st Battalion, 10th SFG during Operation Desert Storm. Mr. Heard is a co-author of FM 3-50.1, *Army Personnel Recovery*, and has worked in the HQDA PR Office since May 2005 as a contractor with TATE, Incorporated. He currently serves as the Central Command Joint Personnel Recovery Agency representative with TATE, Inc.

INTELLIGENCE SHARING:

A NOT SO NEW CONCEPT GIVEN NEW LIFE

MAJOR J.R. JOHNSON

What is the most important task every Soldier is responsible to do that we most need to improve? If you ask a CSM, he may tell you uniform compliance with Army Regulation 670-1. If you ask a team leader, he might say physical fitness, and a squad leader may say rifle marksmanship, but if you ask any S2, he will more than likely say communications!

Why is the intelligence officer so interested in communications? Without effective communications between echelons, an S2 cannot do his job. The most important tool for effective communication is the patrol debrief. A properly filled out patrol debrief paints the scene for an intelligence analyst. It allows the analyst to be in more than one place at a time; it also allows him to not only get a feel for what the enemy might be planning but also how the local population is reacting to both your patrols and the enemy's actions. If this information is effectively communicated, the analyst can compare it with information and intelligence received from higher

SPC Charles W. Gill

A Soldier with the 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment talks to a shop owner in Shulla, Iraq, after violence in the area was reported.

and other units and form an effective picture of the enemy. Without it the analysts can only provide a guess or at best a generalized picture. I will discuss some of the things the Army has done to improve this communication, what intelligence trainers at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, are coaching units on rotation, and some of the impediments to successful implementation that company commanders can face.

With the Army's current decentralized company and battalion operating posts and bases, the importance of communications is ever so critical and its difficulties more magnified. Without daily face-to-face contact, company commanders can feel ignored or shut off by the battalion staffs. FM 3-21.75, *The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills*, instructs every Soldier how to gather information (Chapter 9 - Every Soldier a Sensor), and now the Army has decided to follow its brothers in arms, the Marine Corps, in trying to give the S2 some support at the company level with the formation of the Intelligence Support Team (IST), or company S2. These are non-intelligence MOS Soldiers trained by mobile training teams (MTTs) and on-the-job training (OJT) to do basic collection and analysis, but more importantly provide that vital link of communications between the battalion S2 section and the company. When that relationship is even more stressed by intermittent communications between echelons, they can also provide simple products and basic analysis from their own collection. The basis of implementation for these ISTs is the forthcoming FM 2-91.6, *Soldier Surveillance and Reconnaissance:*

Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection, which supersedes ST 2-91.6, *Small Unit Support to Intelligence*.

As a battalion intelligence observer/controller at NTC, I have advised commanders and first sergeants who come through rotations to dedicate at least three Soldiers, one supervisor and two analysts, and train as many personnel as possible in manning the IST. This normally means at least one additional Soldier in each platoon who is trained and helps the IST when they are not on patrol with their platoon. This gives units redundancy should someone need to be replaced (leave, injury, school, promotion), but more importantly it gives the platoon leader someone he can rely on to understand the information priorities and requirements the platoon needs to collect and report.

Some impediments to this communication are realized during implementation, when careful planning is not conducted and the right personnel are not chosen to fill this role. Just like their intelligence MOS counterparts, these newly trained personnel will require security clearances and need to understand the procedures for safeguarding sensitive information. The information exchanged between the IST and the S2 needs to be safeguarded from prying eyes, such as the trash collector and the CD/DVD salesmen that often hang out near our bases in theater. It is not a requirement to have a clearance before being trained, but certain Soldiers will have difficulty obtaining a clearance later, based on their previous troubles with authority. Those individuals should be identified before wasting training on them. Your S2 can help you to identify

prerequisites and assist in identifying things that may disqualify a Soldier. In addition, a dedicated work space and equipment are necessary to make the IST effective. Oftentimes this simply means a laptop to store files and work on, and space to work. Outline the IST structure and the roles and responsibility of the IST versus the company command post (CP). These seem like obvious requirements, but it is amazing how frustrating it becomes to prepare a product for a patrol getting ready to leave when one just returned and the shared notebook is being used by the returning platoon leader to do ammunition tracking or refine an operation order. While no one likes to give up personnel without a guaranteed return, if you don't set these Soldiers up for success initially by doing these simple things, you guarantee at least one thing: more frustration and time wasted fixing it later.

Most commanders would agree that they do not get enough intelligence from their S2, but is this due to a lack of information or relevance of that information to them? Without proper feedback an S2 cannot tailor a product to what a commander wants or expects, and without proper input an S2 can not make the necessary leaps of assessment when analyzing information to produce relevant intelligence. Which brings us back to that patrol debrief and the IST. The lack of intelligence value is not entirely due to an S2 getting the information he needs, often these days the S2 and his staff are poorly trained, manned, and lack the experience to make their assessments relevant, and that is what I and my counterparts at the Combined Training Centers (CTCs) strive to improve with our coaching and mentoring.

Like a computer, the information received and presentation of that information is only as good as the programs and information put into it and the skill of the person manipulating it. Set yourself up for success by enabling your Soldiers to provide information, and give feedback to the S2 on the outputs of that information whether they are in the form of a daily intelligence summary (INTSUM), patrol pre-brief, or an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) collection matrix. You just might be surprised at how easy it becomes to provide a task and purpose for your next patrol, as it is spelled out to you in the daily INTSUM the S2 passes to your IST supervisor.

MAJ J.R. Johnson is an intelligence officer with prior enlisted service as an infantryman. At the time this article was written, he was serving as an observer/controller for Maneuver Staff and Intelligence at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH INTERVENTION IN THE LEVANT JUNE 8 TO JULY 11, 1941

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENEIN, USN
2ND LIEUTENANT BASIL H. ABOUL-ENEIN, USAF

The defeat of pro-Axis Iraqi regiments led by Prime Minister Rashid Ali Al-Gaylani and the British effort to end the siege of the Habbaniya Air Force Base led to reevaluation of asymmetric agitation in the Middle East by Axis powers. Although the European, Russian and North African fronts in World War II garnered much attention, it is vital that obscure campaigns such as the one in Syria be reexamined. It offers potential lessons in the current war on terrorism that now occupies three major fronts in Iraq, Afghanistan and recently Lebanon. British military planners designed Operation Exporter, which was to put an end to German influence and agitation in the Middle East theater of operations. British military and political leaders were concerned that Vichy (pro-Nazi) French occupation of Syria was a strategic threat to surrounding Allied oil supplies in Iraq, Iran, and the Persian Gulf region. Operation Exporter combined British forces and Free French forces in a plan to invade Syria in June 1941. The aims were to occupy Syria and Lebanon, preventing the establishment of an Axis presence that could threaten British bases in Palestine and oil refineries at Abadan. Consequently, the operation was to enhance Britain's broader strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean. Disentangling the Middle East's complex modern history is important to instilling awareness among America's future military leaders.

During World War II, Syria and Lebanon were French protectorates and had been so since 1919. From 1920 British colonial policymakers worked diligently to create in Iraq a centralized government ruling over a population that was disparate and heterogeneous in the extreme. It had no ties of loyalty to the nation-state of Iraq or affection for its ruler King Feisal I; the only constant were tribal allegiances. Syria, on the other hand, was governed by France's colonial policy and did not face the same problem as British-mandated Iraq. The French were able to pursue a more traditional policy of divide and rule. In the old Ottoman Turkish province of Lebanon, with its Christian majority, small enclaves were divided from Syria to form what would become Lebanon. Areas inhabited by the Druze and Alawi minorities were formed into the enclaves of Jebel Druze and Latakia. The former province of Alexandretta, with its Turkish population, was granted autonomous rule. Syria was originally divided into two states, Damascus and Aleppo, and was reunited in 1925 partly as a result of nationalist pressures and civil unrest. Shaykh Salih ibn Ali led the Alawis; Shaykh Ismail Harir rebelled in the Hawran; and in the Jabal Druze, Sultan Pasha al Atrash, kinsman of the paramount chief of the Druze, led continual resistance, most notably in 1925, calling for unity. On February 9, 1925, to pacify these factions, the French permitted the nationalists to form the People's Party. This party was led by Faris al Khuri, and demanded French recognition of eventual Syrian independence. After the Nazi defeat of France in June 1940, French authorities in Syria recognized the Vichy Government of Field Marshal Philippe Petain and appointed a new Syrian cabinet headed by Khalid al Azm, a son of the Ottoman Minister of Religious Affairs and member of a wealthy Damascus family, as acting president and prime minister.

Reasons the Vichy French Reshuffled the Syrian Cabinet After June 1940

The Vichy French sphere of influence over Syria provided safe passage and refueling for Luftwaffe planes that were en route to aid in an Iraqi revolt that began in 1941. This was suppressed by the British that same year. Vichy France allowed Germany and Italy:

* Full landing and provisioning rights in Syria;

* The right to establish a Luftwaffe base at Aleppo; and

* Permission to use ports, roads, and railways for transport of equipment to Iraq and train Iraqi soldiers in Syria with French weapons.

The Vichy French High Commissioner Henri Dentz had been convinced by Admiral Jean-Francois Darlan, Minister of the Navy, to allow German and Italian aircraft an airbase for logistical support. Darlan, a French naval officer and senior figure of the Vichy France regime, was close to Field Marshal Petain. The French Admiral rose to command the entire Vichy French navy after the dismissal of Petain's deputy, Minister of Foreign Affairs Pierre Laval, for ordering the entire fleet to French North Africa. This was a major mistake which allowed the British fleet to shell and destroy the French Vichy fleet at the Algerian port of Oran. Darlan was also made Minister of the Interior, Minister of Defense and Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Vichy French government. The destruction of the Vichy French Fleet by the Royal Navy in July 1940 combined with the slaughter of French sailors and decision to deprive the Axis of additional valuable warships, aroused anti-British sentiments among Vichy French officials. This resulted in the furthering of Vichy Franco-German military cooperation.

Axis Manipulation of Syrian Governments at Will

Henri Dentz, High Commissioner of the Levant, forced the resignation of neutral Syrian President Emile Iddi and appointed a Pro-Vichy President Alfred Naqqash. On May 8, 1940, it was reported to Berlin that French representatives had agreed to the following concessions from the Naqqash government:

* Stocks of French arms under Italian control in Syria were to be made available for arms transport to Iraq.

* Forwarding of arms shipments of other origins that arrive in Syria by land or sea for agitation in Iraq.

* Permission for the Luftwaffe, destined to Iraq, to make intermediate landings and to take on gasoline in the Levant; providing for operations in Iraq reconnaissance, pursuit planes, and bombers from the Vichy air force permitted by Syria to land and overfly the country under the armistice treaty.

·Providing an airbase in Syria to be made available for Axis use and to assist German planes making intermediate landings.

The British, viewing events and the installing of a pro-Axis Syrian government, imposed an economic embargo on Syria in November 1940. The United States State Department opposed any restrictions on Syria, fearing that such an action would draw Syria even closer to the Germans and have further repercussions on relations with neighboring Arab states. Prior to the blockade, Syrian and German wartime trading succeeded in obtaining Syrian wool, silk, as well as casings via the Turkish route for the manufacture of parachutes needed for the Luftwaffe and Nazi paratroopers. The vitality of Syrian military trading with Germany was a crucial aspect of the Axis war effort.

By late 1940, Nazi Germany sent German representative Werner Otto Von Hentig to Syria to execute Hitler's objectives to use the Levant as a staging area for the assault on Mosul's oil fields in Iraq and the Suez Canal in Egypt. Von Hentig met with several influential leaders of the Syrian nationalist factions including future President of Syria Shukri Al-Quwatli (1943-1949). They discussed increasing German-Syrian economic cooperation and plans to undermine Allied influence in Syria.

With the Axis juggernaut in the Balkans, Rommel's Afrika Korps in the western desert and the Gaylani coup in Iraq, Syria was not among Britain's top priorities in early April 1941. However, in April 1941, Free French leader General Charles De Gaulle arrived in Cairo for consultations with General Georges Catroux and the Allied Middle East Command based in Egypt, and on the agenda of the Free French was Syria. After the successful Allied landings in North Africa (Operation TORCH), Catroux was

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Degaulle-freefrench.png

Free French Force leader General Charles de Gaulle shakes the hand of General Henri Girand in a screenshot taken from the 1943 U.S. Army propaganda film **Divide and Conquer.**

appointed commander in chief of Free French forces in the Middle East. At the Cairo conference, DeGaulle proposed the capture of Beirut, Damascus and the airfield at Rayaq, located approximately 45 miles east of Beirut. It was a tactically strategic Vichy French airbase, but the British seemed reluctant because of the heavy losses inflicted on the Western Desert and would not want to risk thinning the Allied front against Axis positions in Libya against Rommel.

DeGaulle suspected the British of moving into Syria themselves and creating a British Mandate in Damascus. Such was the legacy of the race for colonies started in the latter part of the 18th century. The bitter conflict over who would exercise spheres of influence in the Middle East characterized Anglo-French relations preceding the pre-World War I Sykes-Picot Agreement, which carved out the modern Middle East among Britain, France, and Tsarist Russia.

Vichy War Minister, General Charles Huntziger, sent a message on May 4, 1941, to Vichy High Commissioner in Syria Dentz stating "it is not impossible that you may shortly be faced with a German attempt to give assistance to Iraq. If formations of German aircraft should seek to land on your airfields or should fly over your territory, it would be expedient to consider that France is not in the position of a neutral power with respect to Germany. It is not possible to treat the armed forces of Germany as hostile, but you would naturally oppose with force any intervention by the British forces" (*Iraq and Syria 1941, The Politics and Strategy of the Second World War* by Geoffrey Warner [1974]).

This was followed on May 6 by an order from Admiral Darlan to give German aircraft en route to Iraq "every facility" to continue their journey. Darlan flew to Berlin for consultations with Hitler and Nazi Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop on May 12. The discussions ended with Darlan resolved to take a clear course of entering the war against Britain. Darlan was obviously acting in a conviction that a Nazi victory was at hand, as Allied forces were bloodied at Kasserine Pass. In his book, Warner wrote that Winston Churchill, eager as ever for action, cabled Wavell: "You will no doubt realize the grievous danger of Syria being captured by a few thousand Germans transported by air. Our information leads us to believe that Admiral Darlan has probably made some bargain to help the Germans to get in there. In face of your evident feeling of lack of resources we can see no other course open than to furnish General Catroux with the necessary transport and let him and his Free French do their best at the moment they deem suitable, the RAF acting against German landings. Any improvement you can make on this would be welcome ...."

Nazi agreements with Darlan were foiled on December 24, 1942, when a French anti-Nazi royalist, Ferdinand Bonnier de La Chapelle, entered Darlan's headquarters and assassinated him. De La Chapelle was executed by firing squad two days later. Darlan would be replaced as high commissioner by another French flag officer, General Henri Giraud. German aircraft had been operating from Syrian airfields since April 1941 to support a revolt against the British in Iraq. By the end of May 1941, there were 120 Axis planes in Syria, which was a base of attack towards the British-controlled Suez Canal as well as opening the potential for air raids on the oil refineries at Abadan in the Northern Persian Gulf. The German Luftwaffe operating from the Axis held Dodecanese Islands and Crete, gave an opportunity to bombard Egypt and possibly airlift German airborne troops from bases in Crete. In August 1940, Germans agents arrived with ample support to arouse Arab nationalism and anti-British and anti-Zionist feeling in Syria. Axis agents spread rumors through an extensive system of collaborators and informants that Nazi Germany was in favor of Syrian independence. In consequence, riots broke out in Damascus. The pro-Axis coup in Iraq began to threaten British interests in the region and hence bring Syria ever closer to Axis influence. Just a modest investment in information operations by the Germans led to what one could argue a successful diversion of Allied (mainly British) resources in Iraq. These are lessons one could apply in the current conflict between the United States and Iran, in which Tehran pursues multiple diversionary fronts short of outright war to weaken American objectives in the Middle East. The World War II American Consul in Beirut, Cornelius Van Engert, warned Syrian nationalists of the harm that would befall Syria if it were to fall into German hands. In the article "Syria and State Department" which appeared in the January 1997 issue of *Middle Eastern Studies*, James Melki wrote that Syrian Nationalist leader Fakhri Al-Baroodi stated that "in the past, the fate of the Arabic speaking countries had been in the hands of London and Paris and the results had not been happy either." The Vichy French authorities had dispatched weapons from Aleppo to Baghdad in support of Iraq's pro-Axis Rashid Ali Al-Gaylani's revolt. Melki also wrote that the magnitude of the complicity of Syria in the Iraq revolt had so heightened Allied

distress that the American ambassador to England had reported to have said that "if however, this use by the Germans of Syrian territory for military purposes continues, it is evident that the results will be very serious indeed."

The Vichy French further complicated the Allied situation by sending war material through neutral Turkey and conducting an Axis build up on Turkish southern frontier. This strategically meant Turkey would be cut off geographically from the British, as the Axis would now influence Greece, Syria, instability in British Iraq, and would erode Allied lines of communication with Turkey. In the book *Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War - An 'Active' Neutrality*, author Selim Deringil wrote that British foreign secretary Anthony Eden thought it "essential that we should make plans of our own and that we should take the Turks to a large extent into our confidence; if once the Germans are able to establish themselves in any strength in Syria and succeed in organizing a part of the Arabs against us, Turkey will be effectively surrounded and it would indeed be difficult then to count upon her enduring loyalty ... taking a long view, there is this further consideration: if, as a result of her isolation, Turkey were to cave in and allow passage of German troops into Syria, Germany would presumably be able to accumulate in due course important armored forces in the Middle East. These forces would not be limited by the difficulties of communication and supplies, which hamper any forces advancing on Egypt from the west, and a more formidable German Army could then be maintained and employed from Syria than from Tripoli. The only way to stop this is for Turkey to hold fast, and that could only be achieved at the earliest possible moment with the situation in Syria."

In *Iraq and Syria 1941*, Warner wrote that the British agreed with DeGaulle's plan to wrestle the Levant from the Vichy French, and on May 20 indicated that:

* "Catroux's request was to be granted;
* The Free French were to be given not only the transport they wanted but as much military and air support as possible;
* An immediate Free French declaration of independence for Syria and the Lebanon would be backed by Britain;
* The opportunity was too good to miss; and
* Entering these two territories (Syria and Lebanon) was to be regarded as a political coup rather than a military operation..."

Vichy forces had postured themselves in positions from which they clearly intended to defend Syria against any British or Free French invasions. Warner also wrote that Allied Middle East Commander General Archibald Wavell cabled London that he was "moving reinforcements to Palestine and after full discussion with my colleagues because we feel we must be prepared for action against Syria, the whole position in the Near East is governed mainly by air power and air bases. Enemy air bases in Greece make our hold of Crete precarious and enemy bases in Libya, Crete and Syria would make our hold on Egypt difficult." This shows the central strategic position the Axis enjoyed in Syria, but in the same time Arab politicians in Syria seemed enamored by German nationalism, hoping to duplicate this in the Arab experience.

Despite the approval of Operation Exporter, it very nearly did not take place as planned owing to a combination of military and political factors. On the military side, there were some last minute doubts as to the wisdom of proceeding in Syria with Wavell

From left to right, Field Marshal Archibald Wavell, LTG Joseph W. Stilwell, LTG H.H. "Hap" Arnold, LTG Brehon Somervell and Field Marshal Sir John Dill meet in New Delhi, India.

conducting an imminent counteroffensive in the Western Desert. On the political side, a bitter dispute between the British and the Free French over influence in Syria arose. The Free French regarded the Arab nationalists in the mandate as a matter for their exclusive concern, and regarded British attempt to influence them as part of a design to exclude France from the orient altogether. The National Defense Research Committee (NDRC), an organization created under the aegis of the Council of National Defense to coordinate, supervise, and conduct scientific research on the problems underlying the development, production, and use of mechanisms and devices of warfare in the United States from June 27, 1940, until June 28, 1941, endorsed the decision and Churchill decided to take on both Crete and Syria. The counteroffensive in the western desert failed miserably, largely due to the decision for a simultaneous invasion of Syria.

Operation Exporter

General Archibald Wavell, commander in chief of the Middle East, aimed at gathering the largest possible force to occupy Syria at the earliest date. The Allied ground forces would be made up of the:

* 1st Australian Corps (7th Australian Division and 6th Division: constituent brigades),
* 5th Indian Brigade,
* Free French Division with the use of 12 H39 light tanks,
* Iraqforce, and 10th Indian Division.

In all 18,000 Australians, 9,000 British, 5,000 Free French and 2,000 Indians. The Royal Air Force consisted of 12 Fulmar, 17 Swordfish, and 4 Albacore. General Wavell sent an outline of his plan for the invasion of Syria, code-named Operation Exporter to London.

On May 21, 1941, Wavell ordered the 7th Australian Division to be ready to be deployed to Palestine and ordered General Henry Maitland Wilson, who had assumed command of Palestine and Transjordan, to prepare a plan for an advance on Syria. General Wilson, also known as *Jumbo* Wilson, saw active duty in the Second Boer War and World War I. In June 1939, Wilson was appointed commander of the British and Commonwealth forces tasked with the defense of Egypt and the Sudan. In a broadcast Churchill said, "General Wilson who commands the Army of the Nile, was reputed to be one of our finest tacticians, and few will now deny him that quality." He planned a three-pronged advance, one for Beirut, Rayaq, and Damascus, with possible diversionary raids upon Tripoli in Lebanon and Homs in Syria. It

would not be able to take Aleppo, but Warner wrote that Wavell wondered if the Turks could be convinced to thrust into Aleppo.

The British ambassador in Ankara approached the Turkish Foreign Minister, Sukru Saracoglu on June 2. Saracoglu brought up the question of Syria in a conversation with German Ambassador to Turkey Franz Von Papen. Saracoglu conveyed to Britain that his government could not accept any Allied proposal to occupy Northern Syria as this might involve it in war with France, and possibly Germany. The Allied ground forces were composed of:

* 7th Australian Division headed by Major General John Dudley Lavarack.
* 5th Indian Infantry Brigade group led by Brigadier General Herbert William Lloyd.
* Free French Forces led by General Le Gentilhomme comprising six battalions and a company of tanks.

Allied airforce strength for Operation Exporter would consist of 28 aircraft operating from Palestine and Cyprus. In reserve were the:

* British 6th Infantry Division,
* Australian 17th Brigade,
* Iraqforce (the Allied force occupying Iraq, including the Indian 10th Infantry Division, the British 4th Cavalry Brigade and the Arab Legion).

Hitler sent little support to the Levant as his attention was diverted in Russia, the Balkans and England, as well as sustaining Axis forces in North Africa. Therefore Allied forces would face primarily Vichy ground forces composed of:

* The French Foreign Legion under General Dentz comprised of 18 battalions, with 120 guns and 90 tanks, 35,000 men in all, mainly Senegalese, Algerian and Moroccan.
* 2,000 horsemen and motorized infantry with a few armored cars.
* An airforce of about 90 aircraft.
* A naval task force of two destroyers and three submarines based in Beirut.

Allied Movements in the Levant

The 21st Australian Brigade would advance north, from Palestine, along the Lebanese coast, headed towards Beirut. The 25th Australian Brigade would head for Rayaq Airfield. The 5th Indian Brigade and the Free French Force would march on Damascus. Once these three objectives

were attained, an advance on Tripoli, Homs, and Palmyra to the north would begin.

The invasion began on June 7, 1941, and was met with strong opposition. The Vichy French resisted along all three of the Allied routes of advance. On June 8, while the 21st Australian Brigade crossed the Litani River on the coastal road heading for Beirut, two columns advanced from Jordan. On the Lebanese coastal section, fierce fighting occurred at the banks of the Litani River two days after the invasion to capture key bridgeheads along the river. The 21st Australian Infantry Brigade passed through the area. Sea bombardment of the Lebanese port of Sidon resulted in its easy occupation on June 15. On the central route, Merjayoun, located in Southern Lebanon, was captured on the 11th of June. On June 12 it was decided to transport the bulk of the Allied forces to Merdjayoun and take part in the coastal advance, via a mountainside route that passed through Jezzine. A rapid progress was made by the Indians and Free French towards Damascus but was halted within 10 miles of the capital. With Wavell calling in the reserves of the 6th British division to advance on Palmyra and two brigades of the 10th Indian division in Iraq were ordered to march up the Euphrates River on Aleppo. On June 21, the Syrian capital of Damascus fell to a combined Indian, British, Australian and Free French force. Fighting escalated, however, in Lebanon as the Allies struggled to take the important coastal center of Damour, located 12 miles south of Beirut, which was secured on July 9. Allied concentration on Jezzine and coastal areas commenced. British forces headed north to Beirut and were within a few miles from the Lebanese capital by July 10. General Dentz' forces were diminishing and only one fifth of his air force remained. At 8:30 a.m., on July 12 Vichy envoys arrived to negotiate for an armistice, which was signed at Acre and brought Syria into the Allied fold.

Allied Endgame

The British transferred the mandate administration agreed to after World War I, to Free French forces appointing General Catroux as Delegate-General and Plenipotentiary. General Catroux selected Taj Al-din al-Hassani as president of Syria. Six hundred Palmach (infant Israeli Haganah) units also participated in the invasion of Syria alongside the Allies conducting sabotage of transportation and communication networks. Future Israeli Chief of Staff, Minister of Defense and Minister of Foreign Affairs General Moshe Dayan and future Israeli Prime Minister General Yitzhak Rabin were among the famous members of Palmach who participated in Operation Exporter. Dayan received the British Distinguished Service Order for his actions in the campaign while attached to the Australian 7th Division. In command of reconnaissance units of the Palmach sent to secure a bridge across the Litani River, Dayan lost his left eye when his binoculars were hit by a French sniper's bullet while he was surveying the bridge, earning him his trademark eye patch.

Conclusion

Strategically: The Syrian campaign (Operation Exporter) greatly improved the strategic position of British interests in the Middle East. It removed the threat of any attempt of the Axis penetration eastwards from the Mediterranean and secured the defenses of the Suez Canal and relieved Turkish anxiety of her southern border.

The occupation and conquest of the Levant ended the German advance towards the Persian Gulf and India.

Seeds of the Jewish Armed Underground are planted: The Palmach unit was established by the British on May 15, 1941, to aid the British in the protection of Palestine from Nazi threat. After the British victory at El-Alamein in 1942, the British ordered the dismantling of the Palmach unit. Instead, the whole organization went underground, combining military training with agricultural work which made the Palmach self sufficient and self-funding. They placed heavy emphasis on training field commanders. Their military training by the British came to haunt the British position in Palestine. From the summer of 1945 until the end of 1947, when the British administration suppressed the Jewish settlement movement and blocked Jewish immigration into the country, the Palmach brought ships with tens of thousands of Jewish refugees and Holocaust survivors from Europe illegally. As the British positions began to withdraw from Palestine in May 1948, the Palmach emerged to influence and contribute to Israel's military considerations. Upon the declaration of the state of Israel, May 15, 1948, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) was established, founded on the infrastructure of the Haganah and its striking force, the Palmach. The Palmach unit was dissolved after the formation of the IDF. During the war of independence of 1948, the Palmach units held the Jewish settlements of Gush Etzion, Kfar Darom, and Revivim against Arab militia.

Syrian and Lebanese Confrontation and Independence: As far as the Levant was concerned, the British policy took the form of unrelenting pressure upon the Free French to implement their pledge of independence for the two countries, Syria and Lebanon. This naturally encouraged nationalists and led to periodic confrontations between them and the french authorities. Continuing pressure from Syrian nationalist groups forced the French to evacuate their troops in April 1946, leaving the country in the hands of a republican government that had been formed during the mandate.

Arab Nationalists Misread Allied Victories in 1942: Pro-Axis Syrian leaders would continue to misread the British victory in El-Alamein in Egypt coupled with successful landings of Allied forces in Northwest Africa failing to see the tide was beginning to turn for the Axis. So immersed were nationalist Syrian leaders in uniting Arabs using German nationalist tools perfected after the Franco-Prussian War of 1871 and leading to two World Wars, they misread the beginnings of what would be a massive Russian counteroffensive against the Germans, the loss of Stalingrad from the grasp of the Nazis. This was the tide in 1942 that began to favor the Allies from the Eastern and North African theaters of war.

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The list of references for this article is on file and available through *Infantry* Magazine.

Book Reviews

The Korean War: An Exhaustive Chronology. **By Bud Hannings. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2007, 3 volumes, 1,088 pages, $245.** Reviewed by Russell A. Eno.

Bud Hannings' long awaited history of the Korean War has arrived, and it was well worth the wait. Those of us who have found his earlier chronologies of the First and Second World Wars useful as research sources will not be disappointed in this, his latest opus. Hannings sets the user-friendly tone for the texts when he takes the time to enumerate and explain the contemporary acronyms and abbreviations which follow in all three volumes. The tables are not repeated in the succeeding two books, but this is not a problem, since the reader would have the acronyms pretty much under his belt by the end of Volume 1.

Lavishly supported by photographs, appendices and tables, this three-volume set has some of the best maps I have seen in any book on World War II or the Korean War. They are large, clear, and well-supported by the text. For any student or teacher of Korean War history — assuming he is able to obtain permission to reproduce them for classroom use — these maps can readily be converted into superb overhead projection slides or scanned and digitized for instructional purposes. McFarland and the author have cooperated to publish an imaginative, inspiring history of the Korean War that supports the teaching of this conflict far better than most of the similar texts out today.

The chronological layout and concise nature of the texts affords ready access to day-by-day vignettes of the conflict, something of great value to editors of periodicals which often avail themselves of snapshots of that bitterly contested war fought nearly six decades ago. The Korean War is highly relevant to students and teachers of military history, given the intransigence and bellicose nature of the present North Korean regime, and the costly lessons of un-preparedness at the outset of the conflict underline the importance of vigilance and readiness even today.

Bud Hannings' sheer determination, his tireless effort to produce the best possible books on each of his subjects, and his exhaustive research are nowhere more evident than here. When he describes units locked in combat, he transcends any parochial focus on specific branches or armed services in describing Americans fighting for their buddies, their squads, or their platoons. To be sure, the Marines get their credit, as do the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, but that is not the point of this chronology. The real reason the books were written is captured in the superb foreword crafted by General P.X. Kelley, the 28th Commandant of the Marine Corps. Read it, think about it, and than dive into *The Korean War: An Exhaustive Chronology*; it is worth the read.

The Longest Battle: September 1944 to February 1945, From Aachen to the Roer and Across. **By Harry Yeide. St. Paul, MN: The Zenith Press, 2005, 304 pages, $24.98.** Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Albert N. Garland and Patricia A. Weekley.

In September 1944, optimism filled the air in Allied headquarters all across northwest Europe. Many Allied commanders (primarily U.S. and British) believed their units could easily continue their advances into the heart of Germany against little or no organized resistance. Edward Andidora, writing in the December 1987 issue of *Parameters*, gives an even sharper picture: "But optimism had reached euphoric proportions in the allied camp, bolstered by an almost universal belief that German morale was ready to crack."

But it was not to be, as Harry Yeide, an international analyst with the U.S. Government and author of this book, and Charles MacDonald (*The Siegfried Line Campaign*, a volume in the Army's official WWII History series) point out. Suffice it to point out — the allied advances across Europe and southern France that began in July 1944, were brought to a virtual halt in mid-September 1944 by hastily thrown together German forces. Particularly was this true north of the Ardennes.

Although Yeide says his book "shows some bias toward the allied perspective," I could not find any sign of this. For some reason, he believes that Allied "dreams of quick triumph" only added to the arrogance shown by many U.S. and British high-level commanders in the seeming supremacy of their forces, that nothing could stop them, and total defeat faced the Germans.

Yeide's aim, therefore, is to show that the Allied forces — particularly those from the U.S. — were not invincible, and a badly weakened German army, fighting from bunkers and strong defensive positions in towns and villages (a lesson it had learned on the Eastern front) and using its armor in the best possible way, proved more than a match for our GIs.

Accordingly, he concentrates on the fighting that waged in those small villages and in one large urban area: Aachen (think Iraq and Lebanon). He stays clear of the Huertgen Forest debacle because he believes it "is a tale of military command stupidity with its own internal dynamic that deserves separate treatment." (And it has been covered by several authors, plus a lengthy treatment by MacDonald.)

Aachen was a costly U.S. success, but the Huertgen Forest and the dams were not, at least for several months. I do not understand why he chose to pay so little attention to the U.S. XIII Corps and its actions. I commanded an infantry rifle company in the 84th Infantry Division in that corps from late November 1944 (I was the company XO for six months prior to taking over) to late March 1945, and I know how the Germans fought and what tough opponents they were. I became quite familiar with such towns as Beeck, Lindern, Linnich, and with both sides of the Roer River. Seldom did we fight the Germans in the open.

Yeide likes to tell his readers how well Germans fought and the difficulty our troops had in overcoming the resistance. He

doesn't hesitate to give U.S. casualties but seldom gives German losses. I can assure him the four-buckle overshoes did little to help us with our cold weather injuries. We figured out the answer as we went along even though we were wearing the worse combat boot the Army has created in modern times, and our clothing was not much better. Tanker jackets were prizes; look at the photos of many of our general officers and see what they were wearing!

Yeide does not give us much credit for our crossing of the Roer River in February 1945 and dash to the Rhine River. After all, he believes, the Germans had little to fight with after Hitler's Ardennes counter-offensive in December 1945-January 1945 had been defeated.

I certainly give the German soldiers credit for being tough fighting men. And I give Yeide full credit for his location of, research in, and use of that German material shown by his chapter notes and bibliography. I only wanted him to give the U.S. Soldier equal treatment.

Eisenhower, A Biography (Great Generals Series). By John Wukovits. New York City: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006, 216 pages, $21.95. Reviewed by BG (Retired) Curtis H. O'Sullivan.

An individual as complex as Ike, and with such a varied career, can't be covered in much depth in 216 pages. The intent here seems to be to identify the qualities and events that brought him to success in two fields. Enough time has gone by to reach a dispassionate judgment. The verdict is given with a series of high points linked by anecdotal material — some apocryphal. Heroes tend to gather myths like moss. This leads to an oversimplification and missing the essential issue in a few cases.

The first of these is the illegal receipt of quarters allowance for a son who was not occupying them. Misunderstanding the regulations was a weak defense. Aside from the basic legal "the ignorance of the law is no excuse," common sense says that you shouldn't be paid for something you don't receive. As for "others are doing the same," no parent would let a child get away with that. In this book and elsewhere, it is suggested that Eisenhower was discriminated against by the Chief of Infantry, MG Charles Farnsworth, for espousing tanks in the *Infantry Journal*. It is also possible he didn't like his ethics. The record is not clear why Ike was not selected for the advanced course of his branch at Fort Benning. Under the pattern of that time, about 50 percent of those in the zone of consideration would be chosen. He had performed well enough to be promoted to temporary lieutenant colonel during WW1 and had graduated from the Infantry Tank School at Camp Meade in 1921. It is obvious why, a few years later, he was not in the Infantry quota for the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. Only about 25 percent made this, and he had not completed a normal prerequisite — the Advanced Infantry Officer Course. His mentor and patron saint, BG Fox Conner, pulled an end-run by getting him on the quota for the Adjutant General's Department. To some, this was a neat way of beating the system, but to others it was flagrant favoritism. He did well at the school, graduating #1, in part to the solutions his friend, George Patton, had shared with him from the previous class. This was not considered unethical. It was similar to what every fraternity in the country did for its members. Being at the top helped, but there were 20 others who had been #1 in the inter-war period and none others made it to be supreme commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe.

His next mentor was General/Field Marshal Douglas MacArthur, and the highlights of this period are well covered. Not so well covered were the factors that brought him to Washington after Pearl Harbor. Though Len Gerow was from VMI rather than the Academy, the two of them became very close friends at Fort Sam in 1915 and were classmates at Leavenworth. Gerow became chief of the War Plans Division (WPD) of the General Staff as a BG in December 1940. Eisenhower was known to CSA Marshall but perhaps not on the front pages of his Little Black Book. It was Gerow who called attention to the special background that made Ike ideal for an emergent assignment, getting help to U.S. Army forces in the Far East. His knowledge of the Philippines and long association with MacArthur suited him for this and he did his best, which convinced Marshall he was qualified for more. Gerow was pretty well burned out and was sharing some of the guilt for the War Department failure December 7, 1941. He was promoted to MG and given the 29th Infantry Division. Eisenhower followed him as chief of the WPD and made MG in March 1942. His next assignment as CG of the European Theater of Operations was generally considered to be as a placeholder until things were right for the Chief of Staff to take the field, and his rapid ascent to LTG in July 1942 was necessary to deal with the Allies. Operation Torch in North Africa created an unexpected path and four stars in February 1943, after overcoming the perils on Darlan and the delay of getting to Tunisia. Wukovits summarized this well, and the subsequent operations in the Med, though he doesn't clarify the command structure. The same is true of Overlord, where a new reader might think that Patton reported directly to SHAEF. He brings out the facets of the arguments between the broad and narrow-front approaches. He passes over the possibility of an early crossing the Rhine by the 6th Army Group. Ike didn't like Jake Devers; considered him a rival for Marshall's affection and attention; didn't want him as an AG CG; didn't pay much attention to his advice. Ike's brief tenure as Chief of Staff of the Army is covered even more briefly. His terms as commander in chief are covered in a short chapter which doesn't say much about National Security Council document 162/2, Massive Retaliation, or the New Look.

There are a few unfamiliar items in the photo section. It's unfortunate there's not one of Ike's second mentor, Fox Conner (though he has some space in the text) or the less well-known, Ira Welborn, chief of the Tank Corps in WWI.

This book is based mostly on secondary sources and doesn't reflect any new research. It could be useful in a high school class for someone just meeting Ike. The two-page bibliography has some excellent ideas for learning more, including two of Ike's own works.

Caesar, Life of a Colossus. By Adrian Goldsworthy. Yale University Press, 2006, 583 pages, $35. Reviewed by Chris Timmers.

When one thinks of the Roman Empire, it

is difficult not to be impressed. For more than 500 years, the empire commanded armies in the hundreds of thousands on three continents, managed public affairs at home and in the provinces, and did all this work without the benefit of the internal combustion engine, telephones, a developed road network, or computers (not even pocket calculators). And what did the Romans leave us once their empire fell? Architecture in the form of monuments, public buildings, aqua ducts (some of which are still in use to this day), paved roads, a system of laws, and widespread use of the Latin language, which formed the basis of a number of modern languages. Colossal empires require similar leaders. Caius Julius Caesar fit the bill in every respect.

Caesar did not just live in tumultuous times — he was born into them (in 100 BC). In the first 20 years of the last century BC, Rome was plagued by three civil wars (more would follow). During his time as military commander, consul and dictator, he would expand the empire into Gaul (most of present-day France), Britain, expand holdings in present-day Turkey, and North Africa. His legions would defeat both well-trained armies and barbarians.

Goldsworthy's chronology of Caesar's life is told with accuracy and sympathy, but he never lets the reader forget that Caesar was a highly ambitious ruler, even as a young man and could be, by turns, engaging, treacherous, forgiving, and brutal. And like most successful leaders, he was well impressed with himself. Without going into too much detail, one can site as proof of his self-confidence (others might say arrogance) his dispatch to Rome after the battle of Zela in August of 47 BC when, after routing the army of Pharnaces II of Pontus, he proclaimed: "Veni, Vidi, Vici" (I came, I saw, I conquered).

Perhaps the most engaging chapter is the *Ides of March*, a detailed account of Caesar's final days. On March 14, his wife, Calpurnia, had warned him of calamity through a dream she had had the previous night. Morning rituals at home had revealed bad omens. On his way to address the Senate, he ordered his personal bodyguard to stay at his residence. Why? We'll never know. We do know that he was scheduled to leave Rome in three days to campaign in the Balkans. The conspirators in the Senate had to act soon.

How could this excellent book have been better? I have only two comments here, and the first concerns maps: they are too few and depict hardly any ebb and flow of battle, especially with Gallic tribes. Second, on page 205 Goldsworthy, quoting Caesar from his *De Bellico Gallo*, states that in 58 BC when Helvetian tribes were moving to Cisalpine Gaul, Caesar moved his legions from Rome to the bank of the Rhone in eight days. The rate of march was 90 miles per day. That rate is impossible. At a 12-hour per day march rate, this would equate to an 8-minute per mile rate of advance. Legionnaires carried weapons, helmets, water bottles, packs with food and utensils (figure 20 pounds minimum), wearing sandals, and marching on paved and unpaved roads. This rate of march, with combat gear is equivalent to three-plus marathons per day for eight straight days. Research on a present day army's rate of march from sources such as the French Foreign Legion, British Parachute Regiment, and the U.S. Army state that 30 miles per day is optimal.

But these objections are small stuff. For now, if you want a book on perhaps the greatest Roman of all, latch on to Goldsworthy's work.

Battle for the Ruhr: The German Army's Final Defeat in the West. **By Derek S. Zumbro. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006, 447 pages, $34.95.** Reviewed by LTC Michael A. Boden.

Derek Zumbro's work, *Battle For The Ruhr: The German Army's Final Defeat in the West*, is not so much a history of the battle to close the Ruhr Pocket in March and April of 1945 as an account of the German experience in this area during the closing weeks of World War II. The focus is not on tactical combat actions, but on the personal struggles of the German people, from high-ranking military leaders to villagers, town leaders and children as the Third Reich collapsed around them. It is a fascinating look at this period of the war, hampered only by the periodic lack of contextualizing the situation.

Zumbro relies almost completely on participant accounts when shaping together his history. American and other Allied forces are the supporting cast in his work, providing the backdrop against which the populace of Western Germany was at the forefront. He begins his study somewhat prior to the traditional starting point for studies of the Ruhr fighting (the seizure of the Remagen bridge), by examining the strategic air campaign's effect on the German rear areas in the early months of 1945. He progressed through the key elements of the land campaign: the aforementioned Remagen bridge episode, followed by the dash to Paderborn and the eventual link up of the U.S. Ninth and First Armies. Field Marshal Walter Model features prominently throughout this book, and Zumbro's examination of his final hours is the most thorough to be published in decades.

The pattern of the work is fairly predictable, and follows the experiences of those in the path of the advancing Allied forces. Initially, these people experienced the terror of strategic bombing. Then, they faced the uncertainty of initial encounters with the American and victorious forces. Finally, they suffered through the despair of released prisoners, forced laborers, and retreating German soldiers during the final days of combat. Zumbro's focus remains on these aspects throughout the book, with military perspectives limited to the German side, specifically to the activities of FM Model and his staff, as well as a select number of individual German key leaders. There is very little discussion of Allied plans, strategy, or operations.

While a worthy book, and one of the best studies of the impact of warfare on the German civilian populace in a number of years, the book does not necessarily stand alone. The progress of the action could prove problematic for one not on familiar terms with the military aspects of the battle for the Ruhr pocket. One should have no trouble finding a brief overview of the fighting, and in particular the Allied perspectives of operations. Allied operations were not simplistic, and, especially during the fighting around Paderborn, conditions were very confusing. Once the reader understands the broader historical context within which Zumbro's work is situated, he will have a much greater appreciation for what Zumbro accomplishes here — a telling and worthwhile account from the German perspective of the war's final months in the Ruhr.

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